

2-C-6 | DRAFTS AND NOTES

There is no "unfinished business" exception to the public inspection and copying requirements of Ch. 119, F.S. As the Florida Supreme Court stated in *Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc.*, 379 So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla. 1980), the term "public record" means "any material prepared in connection with official agency business which is intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some type." Such material is a "public record" regardless of whether it is in final form or the ultimate product of an agency. *Id.*

Thus, "[i]nteroffice memoranda and intra-office memoranda communicating information from one public employee to another or merely prepared for filing, even though not a part of an agency's later, formal public product, would nonetheless constitute public records in as much as they supply the final evidence of knowledge obtained in connection with the transaction of official business." 379 So. 2d at 640. See also *Booksmart Enterprises, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble College Bookstores, Inc.*, 718 So. 2d 227, 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (book selection forms completed by state university instructors and furnished to campus bookstore "are made in connection with official business, for memorialization and communication purposes" and are public records); and *National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Associated Press*, 18 So. 3d 1201, 1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), review denied, 37 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010) (transcript and response prepared as part of NCAA disciplinary proceeding involving state university were public records because the "the purpose of the transcript was to perpetuate the information presented to the infractions committee" and the response "was designed to communicate information to the body that would hear the appeal within the NCAA"). Compare *Rogers v. Hood*, 906 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), review denied, 919 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 2005) (unused or unvoted Florida punch card ballots from 2000 election do not constitute public records because they do not "perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge," but a ballot becomes a public record once it is voted because at that point "the voted ballot, as received by the supervisor of elections in a given county, has memorialized the act of voting").

Accordingly, any agency record, if circulated for review, comment or information, is a public record regardless of whether it is an official expression of policy or marked "preliminary" or "working draft" or similar label. Examples of such materials include interoffice memoranda, preliminary drafts of agency rules or



proposals which have been submitted for review to anyone within or outside the agency, and working drafts of reports which have been furnished to a supervisor for review or approval.

In each of these cases, the fact that the records are part of a preliminary process does not remove them from the definition of "public record." When material falls within the statutory definition of "public record" in s. 119.011(12), F.S., and has been prepared to "perpetuate, communicate or formalize knowledge," the record is subject to disclosure even if the agency believes that release of the nonfinal product could be detrimental. See, e.g., *Gannett Corporation, Inc. v. Goldtrap*, 302 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (county's concern that premature disclosure of a report could be harmful to the county does not make the document confidential). As with other public records, only the Legislature has the authority to exempt preliminary or draft public records from disclosure. *Wait v. Florida Power & Light Company*, 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979). See, e.g., s. 119.071(1)(d), F.S., providing a limited work product exemption for agency attorneys.

While the broad definition of the term "public record" ensures that the public's right of access includes preliminary and nonfinal records, the Shevin decision recognizes that not every record made or received in the course of official business is prepared to "perpetuate, communicate or formalize knowledge." Accordingly, preliminary drafts or notes prepared for the personal use of the writer may constitute mere "precursors" of public records if they are not intended to be the final evidence of the knowledge recorded. See *Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc.*, 379 So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla. 1980). And see the discussion of "attorney notes" on pages 131-132.

Thus, public employees' notes to themselves "which are designed for their own personal use in remembering certain things do not fall within the definition of 'public record.'" (e.s.) *Justice Coalition v. The First District Court of Appeal Judicial Nominating Commission*, 823 So. 2d 185, 192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Accord *Coleman v. Austin*, 521 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), holding that preliminary handwritten notes prepared by agency attorneys and intended only for the attorneys' own personal use are not public records. See also AGO 10-55 (handwritten personal notes taken by city manager to assist in remembering matters discussed during manager's interviews of city employees are not public records "if the notes have not been transcribed or shown to others and were not intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge");



and Inf. Op. to Trovato, June 2, 2009 (to the extent city commissioner has taken notes for his own personal use and such notes are not intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge, personal notes taken at a workshop or during a commission meeting would not be considered public records). Compare *Barfield v. City of Sarasota*, 21 F. L.W. Supp 874 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. May 5, 2014), in which the circuit judge ruled that those portions of police officer's notes containing his research on homeless shelters became a public record when he made multiple references to them while answering questions during a presentation at a city commission meeting; however the unread portions of the notes did not become a public record because they were not disseminated.

The relevant test is whether the records have been prepared to "perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some type." See AGO 05-23, stating that "it is only uncirculated materials that are not in and of themselves intended to serve as the final evidence of the knowledge to be recorded that fall outside of the definition of a public record." Accord AGOs 10-55 ("nonfinal documents need not be communicated to anyone in order to constitute a public record") and 04-15 (tape recordings of staff meetings made at the request of the executive director by a secretary for use in preparing minutes of the meeting are public records because "they are made at the request of the executive director as an independent record of the proceedings, and, unlike tapes or notes taken by a secretary as dictation, are intended to perpetuate the discussion at a staff meeting"). See also Inf. Op. to Yoder, November 10, 2014 (video recording of a school board meeting which was made at the direction of a school board member "appears to be a record intended to perpetuate the discussion at the meeting").

For example, in *Miami Herald Media Co. v. Sarnoff*, 971 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), the court held that a memorandum prepared by a city commissioner after a meeting with a former city official, summarizing details of what was said and containing alleged factual information about possible criminal activity, was a public record subject to disclosure. The court determined that the memorandum was not a draft or a note containing mental impressions that would later form a part of a government record, but rather formalized and perpetuated his final knowledge gained at the meeting. See also *Grapski v. City of Alachua*, 31 So. 3d 193, 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), review denied, 47 So. 3d 1288 (Fla. 2010) (canvassing board minutes constitute "final work product of the [b]oard, not a preliminary draft or note"); *City of Pinellas Park, Florida v.*



Times Publishing Company, No. 00-008234CI-19 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. January 3, 2001), available online at the open government site at myfloridalegal.com (rejecting city's argument that employee responses to survey are "notes" which are not subject to disclosure because "as to each of the employees, their responses were prepared in connection with their official agency business and they were 'intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge' that they had about their department"); and AGO 05-23 (handwritten notes taken by an assistant city labor attorney during her interviews with city personnel that were reviewed by the city's labor attorney, used to prepare a disciplinary action form, and then filed, constituted a public record).

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