Under
Title VII (following the
Civil Rights Act of 1991), if an employer’s decisionmaking was based on a “mixed motive” – i.e., a legally permissible motive and an unlawful motive based on a protected class, the employer will be liable and the remedies include:
a) general injunctive relief (provided the plaintiff has standing to seek it);
b) entry of declaratory judgment; and
c) attorneys’ fees and costs.
In a mixed-motives
Title VII case, the employer has an affirmative
defense to certain aspects of
relief (i.e.,
relief particularized to the employee).
42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g). The employer has the
burden of providing the mixed motives
defense, i.e., that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the protected
class into account.
Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, did not refer to retaliation
claims, there is an open question whether
Title VII’s mixed motives provisions, including the affirmative
defense, applies to
Title VII retaliation
claims. Some
courts have
held that it does not. See e.g.,
Kubiko v. Ogden Logistics Services, 181 F.3d 544, 552 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999) (
Title VII’s mixed motives provision is not applicable in a retaliation
claim).
Likewise,
Section 703(m) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not explicitly apply to the
ADEA or certain other
cases, such as whistleblower or other relation
claims (e.g., First Amendment retaliation
cases). Therefore, it is possible that these
cases are still governed by the
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) rule. Under that
rule, an employer may avoid liability by establishing that it would have taken the same
action had it considered only lawful bases. The mixed-motive analysis is available only after the plaintiff establishes that
discrimination “played a motivating part in an employment decision.”
Id. at 251.
American Bar Association // Section of Labor and Employment Law
Equal Employment Opportunity Committee // EEO Law Basics // Spring 2006