Motion Practice
in Florida Appellate Courts
Chapter 3: Relief Available by Motion
§3.A.00 | PROCEDURAL MATTERS69
Footnotes
§3.B.00 | ANCILLARY RELIEF — STAYS70
“shall have continuing jurisdiction, in its discretion, to grant, modify, or deny such relief.”72If issuance of the stay is discretionary, the proper procedure is to file the motion in the lower tribunal. The order entered on the motion is then reviewable simply by filing a motion for review in the case pending before the appellate court.73
There are two situations in which a stay is imposed automatically and without the need for a motion in the lower tribunal. First, a party who has appealed a judgment that is solely for the payment of money may obtain a stay of execution of the judgment under Rule 9.310(b)(1) by posting a bond with the clerk of the lower tribunal in the total amount of the judgment plus two years’ interest at the statutory rate.74 If the bond is posted in the correct amount, the stay is automatic.75 The trial judge has no discretion to require the appellant to post a bond in a higher or lower amount.76
Second, a motion for stay also is unnecessary if the party appealing the judgment is a public officer or a public body. This exception is based on a presumption that a public litigant will be able to pay the judgment if the appeal is not successful. When an appeal is filed by a public officer or public body, the filing of the notice of appeal automatically stays the judgment.77 The opposing party may file a motion in the lower tribunal to vacate the automatic stay, but the lower tribunal may vacate properly an automatic stay in an appeal by a public litigant only in compelling circumstances. The party moving to vacate the stay has the burden of establishing an evidentiary basis for the alleged compelling circumstances.78
Although a motion for a stay pending review should be directed to the lower tribunal initially, the appellate court has inherent authority to issue a stay pending review, even if the motion is presented for the first time on appeal.79
Footnotes
71. The procedure for obtaining a stay pending review is to file a motion in the lower tribunal. Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(a). A special procedure applies if a party is seeking a stay of an administrative order. Id. 9.190(e)(2)(A).
72. Id. 9.310(a).
73. Id. 9.130(f).
74. Id. 9.310(b)(1); Waller v. DSA Group, Inc., 606 S.2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. Dist. App. 2d 1992); Wilson v. Woodward, 602 S.2d 545, 546–547 (Fla. Dist. App. 2d 1991).
75. Hollo v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A., 562 S.2d 730, 731 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1990); Taplin v. Salamone, 422 S.2d 92, 93 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1982).
76. Mellon United Natl. Bank v. Cochran, 776 S.2d 964, 964 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 2000); Campbell v. Jones, 648 S.2d 208, 209 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1994); Proprietors Ins. Co. v. Valsecchi, 385 S.2d 749, 751 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1980).
77. Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(2); City of Delray Beach v. White, 616 S.2d 602, 602 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1993); Navarro v. Bouffard, 522 S.2d 515, 517 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1988).
78. Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Pringle, 707 S.2d 387, 390 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1998); St. Lucie County v. N. Palm Dev. Corp., 444 S.2d 1133, 1135 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1984).
79. See Perez v. Perez, 769 S.2d 389, 393 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1999) (granting a stay filed directly in the appellate court without mentioning the motion and review procedures in Rule 9.310(a)–(f)).
§3.C.00 | DISMISSAL80
(2) the issue raised in the review proceeding is moot,
(3) the party seeking review has disobeyed the order that is the subject of the review proceeding,
(4) the appeal or petition is frivolous, or
(5) the party seeking review has committed a violation of the rules serious enough to warrant dismissal as a sanction.82
Closely related to the issue of appellate jurisdiction is the question of whether there is a case or controversy. This problem is commonly presented by an appeal or petition that initially was within the jurisdiction of the appellate court, but that has become moot by the expiration of time or as a result of subsequent events. Cases of this nature remain within the jurisdiction of the court in a technical sense, but they could be dismissed on the ground that the appellate court’s decision would have no effect on the litigants. An appellate court may retain jurisdiction over an issue that has become moot only in limited circumstances.85
The proper method of asserting a claim of mootness is to file a motion to dismiss. As a practical matter, the mootness of an issue might not be apparent to the appellate court if it were not presented by a party’s motion. The event that makes the issue moot might be a change in circumstances that would not be apparent from anything in the record from the trial court. For this reason, it may be necessary to prepare an appendix to the motion to establish the factual basis for the claim of mootness.
Among the contentions that properly may be asserted in a motion to dismiss is the argument that the proceeding should be dismissed because the appellant or petitioner has disobeyed the order under review. Deliberate noncompliance with the order or judgment may be treated as a waiver of the right to challenge it on review.86 Appellate courts usually allow the offending party an opportunity to comply with the order before dismissing the case in much the same fashion as a litigant would be allowed to purge a contempt.87
Regarding disobedience of a civil judgment, an appellate court may dismiss a criminal appeal if the defendant has become a fugitive and is no longer within the appellate court’s control.88 However, this Rule applies only if the defendant absconds after invoking the appellate court’s jurisdiction.89 A criminal defendant who becomes a fugitive before the sentencing hearing does not forfeit the right to appeal once he or she is taken back into custody and sentenced.90
Another ground for dismissal is that the proceeding before the appellate court is frivolous. This is not often a good basis for a motion to dismiss, given the general legal policy favoring decisions on the merits when possible, and given the fact that it often will be difficult to evaluate the case until the record is filed. After the record is filed, it might be just as easy to affirm the case. There are instances, however, in which appellate courts have dismissed proceedings on the ground that they were frivolous.91 In Florida,
[a] frivolous appeal is not merely one that is likely to be unsuccessful. It is one that is so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little, if any, prospect whatsoever that it can ever succeed.... It must be one so clearly untenable, or the insufficiency of which is so manifest on a bare inspection of the record..., that its character may be determined without argument or research.92Finally, appellate courts may employ dismissal as the ultimate sanction for a failure to comply with the Rules. Although it does not occur frequently, there are instances in which the courts have dismissed a case because the record or appellate brief was not filed within the appropriate time periods.93 In this situation, the power to dismiss an appellate proceeding should be regarded as an extreme remedy.
Footnotes
81. McClain v. Fla. Parole & Probation Commn., 416 S.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1982).
82. Infra nn. 83–93 and accompanying text.
83. E.g. Okeelanta Corp. v. McDonald, 730 S.2d 1283, 1284 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1999) (granting a motion to dismiss an appeal taken from a nonfinal, nonappealable order); Bernstein v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. of Orlando, 384 S.2d 301, 302–303 (Fla. Dist. App. 5th 1980) (dismissing the appeal on the ground that the order under review was not within the scope of the court’s appellate jurisdiction).
84. A motion to dismiss is proper to contest jurisdiction on the ground that the appeal was not timely filed. E.g. Blackstock v. Blackstock, 776 S.2d 359, 359 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 2001) (dismissing an appeal based on the appellee’s motion showing that the notice of appeal was not timely filed).
85. There are exceptions that allow an appellate court to decide an issue of great public importance, an issue that may become moot so quickly that it is capable of repetition yet evading review, or an issue that would have collateral legal consequences. Mazer v. Orange County, 811 S.2d 857, 859 (Fla. Dist. App. 5th 2002).
86. If the appellant has disobeyed an order of the trial court, the appellate court may, in its discretion, entertain a motion to dismiss the appeal. E.g. McLemore v. McLemore, 567 S.2d 23, 24 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1990) (dismissing a husband’s appeal because he failed to comply with the order appealed and because he absented himself during the period of the appeal); Keidaish v. Smith, 400 S.2d 90, 91 (Fla. Dist. App. 2d 1981) (dismissing an appeal because the appellant had fled the jurisdiction with certain items of personal property in violation of the injunction order he was appealing); Simoes v. Simoes, 790 S.2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 2001) (dismissing an appeal based on the appellant’s flagrant noncompliance with the trial court’s orders); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 640 S.2d 133, 134 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1994) (dismissing the appeal on the ground that the appellant had failed to pay his child support and had absconded from the jurisdiction while the appeal was pending); Segall v. Downtown Assoc., 546 S.2d 11, 12 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1989) (dismissing the appeal because the appellant failed to follow post-judgment discovery orders during an appeal from an unsuperseded judgment).
87. If a party has not complied with the order under review, the appellate court must provide a grace period to allow the appellant an opportunity to comply before the appeal is dismissed. Gazil v. Gazil, 343 S.2d 595, 597 (Fla. 1977). However, it is not necessary to offer a grace period before dismissing an appeal if the appellant has absconded from the jurisdiction. Rodriguez, 640 S.2d at 134.
88. An appeal by a criminal defendant is subject to dismissal if the defendant becomes a fugitive after invoking the jurisdiction of an appellate court, but not before. Compare Griffis v. State, 759 S.2d 668, 672 (Fla. 2000) (noting that an appellate court may dismiss an appeal only if “a defendant absconds after filing [the] appeal”) with Abed v. State, 806 S.2d 627, 627 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 2002) (granting a motion to dismiss because the defendant filed an appeal before absconding).
89. Griffis, 759 S.2d at 672.
90. Id.
91. The court can dismiss an appeal that is frivolous. In Beiswanger v. Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities, 563 S.2d 700, 700 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1990), the appellant had advocated a statutory interpretation not supported by the legislative history or the case law and the court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was frivolous. Likewise, in Askew v. Gables by the Sea, Incorporated, 258 S.2d 822, 823 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1972), the court determined that the appeal was dilatory and entered an order of dismissal. It appeared to the court that the appellant had appealed from a post-mandate order of the lower tribunal to relitigate issues that had been decided in the original appeal resulting in the issuance of the mandate. Id. As a general proposition, however, a party should not file a motion to dismiss to argue that an appeal is without merit because such arguments belong in the briefs. Diaz v. Fla. Dept. of Corrections, 511 S.2d 669, 670 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1987).
92. Treat v. State ex rel. Mitton, 163 S. 883, 883 (Fla. 1935) (relying on Brahmbhatt v. Allstate Indem. Co., 655 S.2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1995), to dismiss an appeal on the ground that it was frivolous. The appellant had argued for reversal citing a precedent that supported the trial court’s decision.).
93. E.g. Swicegood v. Fla. Dept. of Transp., 394 S.2d 1111, 1112 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1981).
§3.D.00 | APPELLATE ATTORNEYS’ FEES94
Unlike a motion to tax appellate costs, which is filed in the lower tribunal, a motion for appellate attorneys’ fees must be filed in the appellate court.98 If the appellate court determines that the moving party is entitled to an award of appellate attorneys’ fees, the court may set the amount of fees based on affidavits or may remand the case to the lower tribunal for the assessment of an appropriate amount.99 The lower tribunal lacks jurisdiction to determine entitlement to appellate attorneys’ fees unless a case has been remanded for that purpose.
A motion for appellate attorneys’ fees must be served no later than the time for service of the reply brief.100 This general time requirement applies to appellees even though an appellee ordinarily would not have an opportunity to file a reply brief. The time limitation is keyed to the filing of the reply brief so that the motion will be available by the time the case is ready for consideration on the merits.
In the past, some lawyers simply included a motion for appellate attorneys’ fees as a part of a brief, but this is not an acceptable practice. The motion must be submitted to the court as a separate document so that it can be identified and docketed.101 A motion for appellate attorneys’ fees must meet all of the general requirements that apply to appellate motions, and it also must contain a statement of the substantive ground for an award of fees.102 If the motion is based on a statutory ground, it should refer to the applicable statute and any applicable case law interpreting the statute.103 Similarly, if the attorneys’-fee motion is based on an agreement in a note or contract, the pertinent document should be attached to the motion or cited from the record.
In family-law cases, an attorneys’-fee motion also should contain a statement about the financial needs of the moving party and the ability of the opposing party to pay. An allegation regarding the needs and abilities of the parties is necessary in familylaw cases because appellate attorneys’ fees in such cases are not based on the outcome of the case.104 If the needs-and-ability determination previously has been made in the lower court or by the appellate court, the facts relating to that determination should be set out clearly in the motion.
Appellate attorneys’ fees often are awarded provisionally in family-law cases on the basis of a prior judicial determination with the understanding that the lower court will assess the need for a fee award after considering any changes in the parties’ financial circumstances.105 A provisional award of appellate attorneys’ fees in a family-law case does not always determine the issue of entitlement to fees.106 Such an order merely signifies that there is a basis for a claim of attorneys’ fees and directs the lower tribunal to consider the issue on remand. When the needs-andability test is applied on remand in view of the current financial status of the parties, the trial court may determine that it is inappropriate to award appellate attorneys’ fees.
Family-law cases are unique in that they may involve an award of attorneys’ fees pending an appeal. Rule 9.600(c)(1) states that the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to award and enforce temporary attorneys’ fees in family-law matters.107 An order awarding temporary attorneys’ fees pending an appeal or review proceeding is itself subject to review in the appellate court. Rule 9.600(c)(3) provides that a party may seek review of a temporary attorneys’-fee order by filing a motion in the appellate court within thirty days of rendition of the order.108 As with the final determination, an order awarding temporary appellate attorneys’ fees in a family-law matter is based primarily on the needs-andability determination.
A party may oppose a motion for attorneys’ fees on appeal or review by serving a response in the appellate court within ten days of service of the motion.109 If the motion for appellate attorneys’ fees was served by mail, the opposing party has an additional five days to serve the response.110 A response may be employed to refute the existence of a substantive ground for an award of attorneys’ fees, or it may be filed simply to oppose the award of fees in the amount requested by the moving party.
Footnotes
95. Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b).
96. Id.
97. United Servs. Auto. Assn. v. Phillips, 775 S.2d 921, 922 (Fla. 2000); Judges of the Eleventh Jud. Cir. v. Janovitz, 635 S.2d 19, 20 (Fla. 1994).
98. Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b). The lower tribunal has no authority to award appellate attorneys’ fees in the absence of a mandate from the appellate court. Rados v. Rados, 791 S.2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. Dist. App. 2d 2001); Computer Task Group, Inc., 809 S.2d at 11. The need to file a motion under Rule 9.400(b) is not excused merely because the applicable statute is couched in mandatory terms directing that the court shall award fees to the prevailing party. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County v. Rhea, 661 S.2d 331, 332 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1995); Respiratory Care Servs., Inc. v. Murray D. Shear, P.A., 715 S.2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. Dist. App. 5th 1998).
99. In Sierra v. Sierra, 505 S.2d 432, 434 (Fla. 1987), the Court decided that an award of appellate attorneys’ fees must rest on an evidentiary basis. After the appellate court has ruled that a party is entitled to fees, the correct procedure is to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of fees or allow the parties to present evidence directly to the appellate court in the form of affidavits. Id. Hence, the amount of appellate attorneys’ fees usually is determined in the lower tribunal. Moldthan v. Sentinel Commun. Co., 510 S.2d 1185, 1189 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1987); Henning v. Henning, 507 S.2d 164, 165 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1987); Taggart Corp. v. Benzing Corp., 451 S.2d 1046, 1047 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1984). A remand to the lower court to determine the proper amount of appellate attorneys’ fees does not open the issue of entitlement to fees. Hernstadt v. Brickell Bay Club Condo. Assn., Inc., 602 S.2d 967, 968 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1992). If the appellate court has granted appellate attorneys’ fees, the lower court subsequently cannot determine that the moving party is not entitled to fees. Id. In some cases it may be necessary for the trial court to determine the amount of fees only for the successful portion of the appeal. Imperial Terrace E. Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Grimes, 666 S.2d 276, 277 (Fla. Dist. App. 5th 1996).
100. Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b); Antennas for Commun. v. Compton, 482 S.2d 610, 610 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1986); Joseph Land & Co. v. Green, 486 S.2d 87, 87 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1986); Computer Task Group, Inc., 809 S.2d at 11. In Lobel v. Southgate Condominium Association, Incorporated, 436 S.2d 170 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1983), the court denied a motion for attorneys’ fees filed more than five months after the date of service of the reply brief. Id. at 171. The court said, “Increasingly we note a tendency to seek attorney[s’] fees out of season.” Id.
101. Melweb Signs, Inc. v. Wright, 394 S.2d 475, 477 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1981); McCreary v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Casualty Jt. Underwriting Assn., 758 S.2d 692, 696 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1999).
102. Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b). Rule 9.400(b) provides that a motion for appellate attorneys’ fees “shall state the grounds on which recovery is sought.” A motion that fails to state the ground upon which recovery is sought is insufficient. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 775 S.2d at 922; Shuler v. Darby, 786 S.2d 627, 630 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 2001). The presence of a statute creating the entitlement to fees does not relieve the parties of their obligation under Rule 9.400(b) of filing a timely motion for attorneys’ fees in the appellate court. See supra n. 23 and accompanying text (discussing time requirement for filing a motion for attorneys’ fees).
103. A motion for appellate attorneys’ fees based on a statutory ground “should refer to the statute, as well as specifying the appropriate sections and subsections of the statute, along with the year of the statute.” Lehigh Corp. v. Byrd, 397 S.2d 1202, 1205 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1985).
104. A motion for appellate attorneys’ fees in a family-law case should contain an allegation concerning needs and ability. Rosen v. Rosen, 696 S.2d 697, 699–700 (Fla. 1997). Appellate attorneys’ fees in family-law cases are not limited to the prevailing party, and may be awarded, in the discretion of the appellate court, on the basis of the needs of one spouse and the financial ability of the other, and to a lesser extent on other factors such as the length and scope of the litigation and the parties’ behavior during the litigation. Id. at 700–701; see generally Rados, 791 S.2d at 1131–1135 (providing a detailed discussion of attorneys’ fees on appeal in family-law cases).
105. The practice of provisionally awarding appellate attorneys’ fees, subject to a post-mandate hearing in the lower tribunal, was popularized by Dresser v. Dresser, 350 S.2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1977). At least one appellate court has modified the procedure to delegate the determination of a party’s entitlement to fees to the trial court in certain circumstances, subject to review by the appellate court by motion. Rados, 791 S.2d at 1131.
106. White v.White, 695 S.2d 381, 383 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1997).
107. Fla. R. App. P. 9.600(c)(1). According to Rule 9.600(c)(1), the lower court has continuing jurisdiction to enter and enforce orders awarding temporary attorneys’ fees to prosecute or defend an appeal in a family-law matter. See Swartz v. Swartz, 691 S.2d 2, 3 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1996) (applying Rule 9.600 in a dissolution-of-marriage action). Such an order is then subject to review in the appellate court under Rule 9.600(c)(3). White v. White, 683 S.2d 510, 511 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1996). The opportunity for temporary attorneys’ fees is limited to family-law actions under Chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes. Consequently, a party is not entitled to temporary appellate attorneys’ fees in an action to establish paternity. Gilbertson v. Boggs, 743 S.2d 123, 128 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1999).
108. Fla. R. App. P. 9.600(c)(3).
109. Id. 9.300(a). Failure to serve a timely response to a motion for appellate attorneys’ fees may be treated as a waiver of the right to oppose an award of fees. Homestead Ins. Co. v. Poole, Masters & Goldstein, C.P.A., P.A., 604 S.2d 825, 827 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1991).
110. Fla. R. App. 9.420(d); see text accompanying supra n. 59 (noting that responses to motions in appellate courts must be served “within ten days of service of the motion”).
§3.E.01 | CORRECTING OR MODIFYING APPELLATE DECISIONS – REHEARING111
Rule 9.330(a) once included a statement that rehearing “shall not re-argue the merits of the court’s order.”113 This prohibition was difficult to follow and even more difficult to enforce. Some lawyers used the opportunity to correct an oversight or omission as a routine step in the process of advocating their position. Appellate judges observed that rehearing motions were often nothing more than a restatement of the arguments presented in the briefs.114
In the 2000 revision of Rule 9.330(a), the Supreme Court deleted the prohibition against reargument of a case.115 Under the present version of the Rule, an attorney may argue a point decided by the court. However, it is still improper to use a motion for rehearing to voice disagreement with the court. The essential purpose of a motion for rehearing has not changed; it is still used to bring to the attention of the court a point that was overlooked or misapprehended.
Rule 9.300(a) now states that a motion for rehearing “shall not present issues not previously raised in the proceeding.”116 This addition, also made in 2000, incorporates a principle that had been established in the case law. An appellate court is not required to consider a point presented for the first time in a motion for rehearing, even if the point is one that might have changed the result of the case.117 A motion for rehearing must address some error or omission in the resolution of an issue previously presented in the main argument. Allowing consideration of new issues after a case has been decided would be inconsistent with the general purpose of Rule 9.330(a); that is, to enable the court to address matters that were overlooked or misunderstood.
It is not appropriate in any circumstance to file a motion for rehearing to attack the court or opposing counsel. The court is not likely to tolerate a motion for rehearing that is written to express disappointment or to satisfy the emotions of the unsuccessful party. Rule 9.410 authorizes the appellate court to impose sanctions for the filing of any motion that is frivolous or in bad faith.118 The courts have used this general authority to impose sanctions for abuses of the rehearing procedure.119
A motion for rehearing may be directed to a decision that is not supported by an opinion, but it would be difficult to argue that the appellate court overlooked or misunderstood something about the case if there has been no written opinion and, therefore, no indication of the basis of the court’s decision. Some appellate courts have discouraged rehearing motions that are directed to decisions without opinions.120
Generally, a party may file only one motion for rehearing in a single case.121 However, in exceptional situations the courts have allowed a second motion to be filed. For example, successive rehearing motions were allowed in a case in which the court’s opinion on the first rehearing was so different from its initial opinion that it amounted to a totally new decision.122 The court reasoned that it would be fair to allow the unsuccessful party another opportunity for rehearing. If a second motion for rehearing is to be filed, counsel should recognize the provisions of Rule 9.330(b) in the motion and explain the reasons the court should allow an exception to the Rule.
While an appellate decision generally is subject to only one motion for rehearing or clarification, Rule 9.330(b) expressly authorizes the filing of both a motion for rehearing and a motion for certification.123 Rehearing and certification are remedies that may be pursued separately or in conjunction with each other.
Rule 9.330(a) provides that a motion for rehearing, clarification, or certification must be filed within fifteen days from the date of the decision of the appellate court.124 However, the time for filing a motion for rehearing is not jurisdictional.125 The appellate court has authority to enlarge or reduce the time before it expires.126 Moreover, the court has authority to accept a motion for rehearing filed beyond the time allowed by the Rule, even though the party filing the motion has no right to reconsideration on the merits. Of course, it would not be wise to rely on the court’s authority to consider a belated motion for rehearing. The only safe way to ensure that a motion for rehearing will be considered is to file the motion within the applicable time period.
The time allotted for filing a motion for rehearing is the same for each party to the proceeding in the appellate court, and the time available to one party is not affected by the actions of another. 127 For example, the filing of a notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court before the expiration of time for filing a motion for rehearing in the district court does not cut off the rights of other parties to seek rehearing or clarification in the district court. If time remains, any other party to the proceeding in the district court has a right to seek rehearing or clarification.
A party may oppose a motion for rehearing by serving a response within ten days of service of the motion to which it is directed. 128 However, a response often is unnecessary. If the motion is nothing more than a second effort to present an argument that was fully considered and rejected, the response will not be of much value. In this situation, the response merely will add to the time the court will be required to spend in disposing of the motion. Counsel for the prevailing party may safely assume that the court will reject an improper rehearing motion on its own, without the need for a response.129 In contrast, if the motion for rehearing does raise a matter that was overlooked or misapprehended, it is advisable to file a response to persuade the appellate court to adhere to its original decision.
Preparing an effective motion for rehearing requires a different form of advocacy from that employed in writing an appellate brief. Once a decision has been made, the client’s objective can be accomplished only by considering the need for rehearing from the appellate court’s point of view. For that reason, the emphasis of the motion should be to show why the court should reconsider its decision, and not to explain why the client should have prevailed.
Appellate counsel must carefully and objectively consider whether there is a need for a rehearing and whether a valid ground exists. The courts increasingly have expressed intolerance of rehearing motions that amount to no more than a reargument of the issues addressed in the briefs.130 If the appellate court has not overlooked or misunderstood some important aspect of the case, the motion should not be filed.
If a valid reason exists to justify filing a motion for rehearing, the motion should describe the reason without restating the argument on the merits of the case. It is not appropriate to express disagreement with the court, but that does not mean that the attorney must relinquish his or her role as an advocate. To the contrary, the focus of the advocacy merely shifts from demonstrating the merits of a position to revealing an error or omission worthy of the court’s reconsideration. The argument should be designed to convince the court that it missed an important point, and not to reestablish the position of the unsuccessful party by more persuasive advocacy.
Rule 9.330 requires a statement of particularity regarding the points of law or fact that were overlooked or misapprehended by the court,131 but this does not mean that a motion for rehearing should be lengthy or exhaustive. As a practical matter, a concise, yet adequately detailed motion, will stand a much better chance of success. A motion for rehearing that is too long is more likely to be viewed as an attempt to reargue the matters addressed in the brief.
A party may request that a panel decision be reconsidered by all judges serving on a district court of appeal by filing a motion for rehearing en banc. However, this is an exceptional remedy that can be employed in only limited circumstances. The motion must be based on a claim that en banc review is necessary to maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions or that the case is one of exceptional importance.132
There are strict procedural requirements that must be met when filing a motion for rehearing en banc. First, the motion must be timely filed in conjunction with a motion for rehearing directed to the panel.133 If the en banc motion is not accompanied by a motion for rehearing, it will be ineffective as a basis for any relief and it will be disregarded by the court.134 The requirement that the en banc motion be filed in conjunction with a motion for rehearing ensures that the assigned panel will have an opportunity to evaluate the need for rehearing before the request is presented to the entire court.
A second essential requirement is that the attorney filing the motion include a statement certifying the existence of a proper ground for en banc consideration.135 Depending on the ground asserted, Rule 9.331(d)(2) requires that the motion contain one of the following two certificates:
I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied professional judgment, that the panel decision is of exceptional importance.A motion for rehearing en banc will not be put to a vote unless requested by at least one judge on the court.137 The request for a vote on the en banc motion need not be made by a judge on the original panel, but a judge who was not on the panel may be unaware that such a motion has been filed. As explained in the committee note to Rule 9.331(d), “non-panel judges” have no obligation to review a motion for rehearing en banc until a vote is requested by another judge.138 Hence, it is possible that a motion for rehearing en banc will not be considered by all of the judges on the court.[o]r
I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied professional judgment that the panel decision is contrary to the following decision(s) of this court and that a consideration by the full court is necessary to maintain uniformity of decisions in this court (citing specifically the case or cases).136
If the panel denies the motion for rehearing submitted in conjunction with the motion for rehearing en banc, that denial is considered as a denial of the en banc motion as well.139 A separate order on a motion for rehearing en banc is required only if the motion is granted. In that event, the district court may require the parties to submit additional briefs or limit the issues for en banc consideration.140
To prevail on a motion for rehearing en banc, the moving party must persuade a majority of those active judges participating and voting on the motion about the merits of the case. If there is a tie vote, the panel decision stands as the decision of the court; if there is no panel decision, a tie vote will affirm the action of the trial court.141 If the en banc proceeding is based on intra-district conflict, the panel decision that becomes the decision of the court as a result of a tie vote is the decision of the panel in the previous case before the district court of appeal.142
Rehearing en banc is regarded by the appellate courts as an extraordinary proceeding, and appellate attorneys should treat it as such. A great deal of credibility could be lost by using the rehearing en banc procedure as a routine step in the appellate process. In contrast, an attorney who employs the remedy sparingly is more likely to be successful in a case that presents a genuine ground for en banc consideration.
Footnotes
112. Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a).
113. Id. 9.330(a) comm. nn. 2000 amend. (quoting the former language of the Rule).
114. The prior version of Rule 9.330(a) contained an express prohibition against reargument of the merits on rehearing. Barnes v. State, 743 S.2d 1105, 1113 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1999). In Whipple v. State, 431 S.2d 1011, 1012–1016 (Fla. Dist. App. 2d 1983), the court wrote a detailed opinion explaining the rehearing process and warning attorneys against the use of rehearing motions to reargue the merits of a case. After reviewing statistics on the number of rehearing motions filed, the Whipple court noted that most attorneys have the mistaken belief that a motion for rehearing is “a routine step in appellate practice.” Id. at 1013. Similarly, in Jackson v. United States Aviation Underwriters, Incorporated, 466 S.2d 1119, 1119–1120 (Fla. Dist. App. 2d 1985), the court concluded that the rehearing motion was a “paradigm” of abuse, and that each time the rule is abused “the time and effort of three judges is wasted.” The motion for rehearing in Gainesville Coca-Cola v. Young, 632 S.2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1993), consisted of an eight-page restatement of the law and facts contained in the appellees’ brief. The court denied the motion on the ground that it contained an improper reargument of the case. Id.; e.g. Jacobs v. Wainwright, 450 S.2d 200, 201 (Fla. 1984); Parker v. Baker, 499 S.2d 843, 847–848 (Fla. Dist. App. 2d 1986); Seslow v. Seslow, 625 S.2d 1248, 1248 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1993).
115. Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a) comm. nn. 2000 amend.
116. Id. 9.330(a).
117. Blinn v. Fla. Dept. of Transp., 781 S.2d 1103, 1110 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 2000); Ayer v. Bush, 775 S.2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 2000); see Taylor v. Johnson, 581 S.2d 1333, 1338 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1990) (declining to consider a new issue raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing); Sag Harbour Marine, Inc. v. Fickett, 484 S.2d 1250, 1256 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1985) (denying rehearing because the matter was not previously presented in the brief in a meaningful way); Fiesta Fashions, Inc. v. Capin, 450 S.2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1984) (denying a motion for rehearing when appellants raised issues not contained in their brief); Alvarado v. State, 466 S.2d 335, 338 (Fla. Dist. App. 2d 1985) (denying a motion for rehearing because “[t]he question of affirmative selection was not presented... on direct appeal”); E. Airlines, Inc. v. King, 561 S.2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1990) (holding that an issue that was not presented in the briefs cannot be presented for the first time on rehearing); Araujo v. State, 452 S.2d 54, 58 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1984) (rejecting a claim made for the first time on rehearing and scolding the attorney for having the “effrontery” to say that the point was overlooked or misapprended by the court); Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distributors, Inc., 442 S.2d 958, 960 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1983) (rejecting a meritorious contention on rehearing that the appellant had failed to make a timely objection in the lower tribunal because the argument had been presented for the first time on rehearing). A district court does not have jurisdiction on rehearing to challenge an order that was not appealed or cross-appealed. Rety v. Green, 546 S.2d 410, 426 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1989). However, in Ratley v. Batchelor, 599 S.2d 1298, 1303–1304 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1991), the court addressed a new argument on rehearing to provide guidance for the parties and the trial court on remand. The court acknowledged the general rule that an appellate court will not consider an argument that is made for the first time in a motion for rehearing. Id. at 1303. However, courts have discretion to consider a point made for the first time on rehearing. See Perez v. State, 717 S.2d 605, 606 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1998) (diverting from general practice to “consider[ ] an argument where” there were “recent developments in the law”); Jaworski v. State, 804 S.2d 415, 419 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 2001) (acknowledging the general rule but evaluating an argument made for the first time in the appellee’s motion for rehearing, based on the principle that the court must consider any basis to affirm).
118. Fla. R. App. P. 9.410.
119. In Elliott v. Elliott, 648 S.2d 135, 135–136 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1994), the court denied an argumentative motion for rehearing that simply expressed displeasure with the court and counsel. Because the rule is clear and because there are many warnings in the case law about the limited scope of a motion for rehearing, the court entered an order directing the movant’s attorney to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. Id. at 136. In Patton v. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Office of Child Support Enforcement, 597 S.2d 302, 302–304 (Fla. Dist. App. 2d 1991), the court denied a motion for rehearing on the ground that it was an attempt to reargue the case. Unprofessional accusations in the motion also prompted the court to refer the lawyer to The Florida Bar. Id. at 303–304. In Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation v. Reitzes, 631 S.2d 1100, 1100–1101 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1993), the court expressed its displeasure with the inordinate number of rehearing motions filed to re-argue the merits of the case. The court issued an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for improper reargument. Id. at 1101.
120. E.g. Snell v. State, 522 S.2d 407, 407 (Fla. Dist. App. 5th 1988) (holding that a motion for rehearing of an affirmance without opinion was an abuse of the rehearing procedure, particularly because the motion merely restated the arguments in the initial brief); contra Sinkfield v. State, 592 S.2d 322, 322 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1992) (granting a motion for rehearing directed to a per curiam affirmance without an opinion because there had been an intervening decision of the same court to the contrary); Patton, 597 S.2d at 303 (suggesting that it is proper to file a motion for rehearing directed to a per curiam affirmance without opinion).
121. Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(b).
122. In Dade Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Smith, 403 S.2d 995, 999 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1981), the court allowed a second rehearing motion notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 9.330(b). The opinion on the first motion for rehearing changed the entire basis of the court’s decision. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that it was like a new opinion and held that it was subject to another rehearing motion. Id. Ordinarily a party may file only one motion for rehearing and one motion for certification and the motions must be filed within fifteen days of the decision to be certified. Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(b). However, in DeBiasi v. Snaith, 732 S.2d 14, 17 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1999), the court stated in dicta that it would entertain a subsequent motion for certification if a motion for rehearing resulted in a new opinion.
123. Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(b). Rule 9.330(b) provides that “[a] party shall not file more than [one] motion for rehearing or for clarification of decision and [one] motion for certification with respect to a particular decision.”
124. Id. 9.330(a).
125. Thompson v. Singletary, 659 S.2d 435, 436 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1995); Maffea v. Moe, 483 S.2d 829, 831 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1986). Consequently, the appellate courts may consider belated rehearing motions. While the rule authorizes the appellate court to consider a motion out of time, a request to do so must be accompanied by a showing of good cause. Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 802 S.2d 486, 489 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 2001). It should be noted, however, that an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to consider an untimely motion for rehearing filed after the expiration of the term of court in which the decision was made. Orange Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Dykes, 444 S.2d 1152, 1152–1153 (Fla. Dist. App. 5th 1984).
126. Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a). Rule 9.330(a) states that “[a] motion for rehearing, clarification, or certification may be filed with [fifteen] days of an order or within such other time set by the court.” Implicit in this statement is the authority of the appellate court to enlarge or reduce the fifteen-day time period. Rule 9.330(c) contains a similar statement implying that the court has authority to reduce or enlarge the ten-day period for filing a motion for rehearing in bond validation proceedings. A party has fifteen days to file a motion for rehearing or clarification. Hoenstine v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 742 S.2d 853, 854 (Fla. Dist. App. 5th 1999) (stating that a motion for rehearing must be filed within fifteen days pursuant to Rule 9.330(a)).
127. In Portu v. State, 654 S.2d 169, 169 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1995), the State filed a notice of intent to seek discretionary review in the Supreme Court before the time for filing a motion for rehearing expired. The defendant filed a motion for clarification, which the court granted. Id. The court held that the early filing of a notice of intent to seek discretionary review does not cut off the rights of another party to file a timely motion for rehearing. Id. at 170.
128. Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a). Rule 9.330(a) provides that “[a] response may be served within ten days of service of the motion.”
129. Appellate courts are aware of the fact that many attorneys file rehearing motions inappropriately. See Whipple, 431 S.2d at 1013 (stating that “motions for rehearing were filed in about one out of every four cases... heard on the merits”); Araujo, 452 S.2d at 58 (criticizing the Assistant Attorney General for making an argument for the first time in a motion for rehearing). In light of these cases, the prevailing party should have some degree of confidence that an improper rehearing motion will be rejected by the appellate court without the need for a response.
130. Supra nn. 114, 117, 119.
131. Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a).
132. Rule 9.331(a) sets forth the grounds for hearings and rehearings en banc. Examples of cases in which courts granted en banc rehearing to resolve intradistrict conflict include Jones v. State, 790 S.2d 1194, 1196 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 2001), Palm Bay Towers Corporation v. Brooks, 466 S.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1984), Jaris v. Tucker, 414 S.2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1982), and Puga v. Suave Shoe Corporation, 417 S.2d 678, 678 (Fla. Dist. App. 3d 1982). In contrast, the First District denied en banc consideration in Walker v. State, 442 S.2d 977, 978 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1983), because the panel decision did not conflict with the court’s prior decisions. For a discussion of Florida district courts’ authority to sit en banc, see Harvey J. Sepler, En Banc Review in Florida Appellate Courts, 62 Fla. B.J. 37, 37–39 (May 1988). Exceptional importance and uniformity of decisions were both cited as reasons for granting rehearing en banc in Felts v. State, 537 S.2d 995, 1004 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1988). The uniformity ground was based on several inconsistent panel decisions that had not yet been released. Id.
133. The motion must be filed “within the time prescribed by [R]ule 9.330,” which is fifteen days from the date of the decision. Fla. R. App. P. 9.331(d)(1).
134. State v. Kilpatrick, 420 S.2d 868, 869 (Fla. 1982) (holding that a motion for en banc review, which was filed separate from a motion for rehearing, was impermissible under Rule 9.331(c)); La Grande v. B & L Servs., Inc., 436 S.2d 337, 337 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1983) (holding a motion for en banc review null and void because it was not filed “in conjunction with a Rule 9.330(a) motion for rehearing”).
135. A motion for rehearing en banc must contain the required statement of counsel. In Gainesville Coca-Cola, the court questioned the propriety of the certificate in support of a motion for rehearing en banc. 632 S.2d at 84. The lawyer certified “‘based on a reasoned and studied professional judgment, that the panel decision in this case is of exceptional importance,’” but the court concluded that certification was made only to meet the requirements of Rule 9.331(d)(2). Id. (quoting the appellee’s Motion for Rehearing En Banc).
The opinion was a two-paragraph per curiam decision reversing on the ground that the order was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Id. There was nothing about the case that could add to the jurisprudence of the state on the subject matter of the case. Id. Moreover, there was no explanation why counsel believed that the case was one of exceptional importance. Id. Although the motion was in proper form, it was totally without merit. Id. The court published the opinion to deter improper motions for rehearing en banc. Id.
A motion for rehearing en banc was denied in Havener v. Havener, 473 S.2d 708, 708 (Fla. Dist. App. 2d 1985), because it did not contain the required statement of counsel. The court treated the en banc motion as a motion for rehearing. Id. For another example of a case in which the court treated an en banc motion as a motion for rehearing, see Thompson v. State, 483 S.2d 1, 1 (Fla. Dist. App. 2d 1985).
136. Fla. R. App. P. 9.331(d)(2).
137. Id. 9.331(d)(1) (stating that a vote will not be taken on the merits of a motion for rehearing en banc “unless requested by a judge on the panel that heard the proceeding, or by any judge in regular active service on the court”).
138. Id. 9.331 comm. nn. 1994 amend. Rule 9.331(d)(1) provides that “[j]udges who did not sit on the panel are under no obligation to consider the motion [for rehearing en banc] unless a vote is requested.”
139. The district courts of appeal can effectively deny a motion for rehearing en banc without a formal order on the motion. Under the provisions of Rule 9.331(d)(3), the denial of rehearing or the grant of rehearing without en banc consideration shall be deemed as a denial of the motion for rehearing en banc.
140. The district court can require additional briefs on a motion for rehearing en banc. Regency Inn v. Johnson, 422 S.2d 870, 874 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1982) (mentioning that additional briefs were requested in connection with a motion for rehearing en banc).
141. Fla. R. App. P. 9.331(a); e.g. State v. Falls Chase Spec. Taxing Dist., 424 S.2d 787, 819 (Fla. Dist. App. 1st 1982); State v. Bankowski, 570 S.2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. Dist. App. 4th 1990); O’Brien v. State, 478 S.2d 497, 499 (Fla. Dist. App. 5th 1985). A tie vote on a motion for rehearing en banc does not suggest that the issue is one that should be certified to the Supreme Court for resolution. Fla. R. App. P. 9.331 comm. nn. 1982 amend.
142. O’Brien, 478 S.2d at 499.
§3.E.02 | CORRECTING OR MODIFYING APPELLATE DECISIONS - CLARIFICATION
Rehearing and clarification are different remedies. A motion for rehearing may be appropriate in a case in which the appellate court clearly stated its opinion, yet apparently missed a key point, while a motion for clarification may be called for in a case in which the appellate court failed to explain its decision adequately, but evidently did not overlook or misunderstand any of the controlling points.
Although the rules do not prohibit the filing of a motion for clarification when the appellate court has decided the case without an opinion, the moving party has a more difficult task in presenting the motion in this situation. The need for clarification implies that there is something about an opinion that requires further explanation. Asking the court to clarify a per curiam decision summarily affirming a case is tantamount to asking the court to write an opinion in the case.
A request for rehearing and a request for clarification may be made together in a single motion styled as a motion for rehearing or clarification. The practice of filing both motions may be advantageous if clarification of a district court decision would resolve an ambiguity about what should occur on remand or if clarification would provide a possible basis for supreme court review.
Rule 9.330(b) provides that a party may file only one motion for rehearing or clarification.144 Thus, an appellate decision is subject to only one request for clarification, whether the motion for clarification is made on its own or as a part of a motion for rehearing. However, the rule does permit the filing of both a motion for clarification and a motion for certification.145 Clarification and certification are remedies that may be pursued separately or in conjunction with each other.
If the district court’s decision conflicts with decisions of other district courts, although not expressly so, it may be a good strategy to file a motion for clarification as a preliminary step in an overall plan to seek discretionary review in the Supreme Court. If there is a conflict that was not dealt with directly in the opinion, the district court may expressly acknowledge the conflict in the opinion on clarification. The danger in this strategy, however, is that the court may attempt to distinguish the conflicting cases in the process of clarifying its decision. That would make it more difficult to obtain discretionary review in the Supreme Court.
Footnotes
144. Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(b).
145. Id. Rule 9.330(b) provides that
“[a] party shall not file more than [one] motion for rehearing or for clarification of decision and [one] motion for certification with respect to a particular decision.”
§3.E.03 | CORRECTING OR MODIFYING APPELLATE DECISIONS - CERTIFICATION
The time limitations applicable to motions for rehearing and clarification also apply to motions for certification. Rule 9.330(a) provides that a motion for certification must be filed in the lower appellate court within fifteen days of the decision to be certified for review.148 A party opposing certification may file a response within ten days of service of the motion.149
Only one motion for certification is permitted as to a given appellate decision, but filing such a motion does not preclude alternative relief by rehearing or clarification. A motion for certification may be filed as an exclusive remedy or in conjunction with a motion for rehearing or clarification.150
Footnotes
147. Id.
148. Id. The time runs from the original decision and not from a subsequent order denying rehearing. Certification and rehearing are not sequential remedies. DeBiasi, 732 S.2d at 16.
149. Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a).
150. Id. 9.330(b).
§3.F.00 | REVIEW OF ORDERS ENTERED BY THE LOWER TRIBUNAL151
Motions for review frequently are employed to challenge orders of the lower tribunal relating to stays and post-trial release. Rule 9.310(f) provides that an order of the lower tribunal granting or denying a stay while an appellate proceeding is pending is subject to review by motion filed in the appellate court.152 Similarly, Rule 9.140(g)(4) allows a party who wishes to challenge the correctness of a post-trial release order in a criminal case to do so simply by filing a motion for review in the appellate court.153
The opportunity for appellate review by motion also exists for alimony and support orders entered by the lower court during an appeal in family-law cases. Rule 9.600(c)(1) provides that the lower court has continuing jurisdiction to enter orders on alimony, child support, and other family-law matters during appeals in dissolution-of-marriage actions.154 All such orders can be reviewed by filing a motion in the appellate court in the pending review proceeding.155
An order of the lower tribunal on motions to tax costs on appeal also is subject to review by motion in the appellate court. The lower tribunals have exclusive authority to tax costs following an appeal. Although the appellate court determines the issue of entitlement to appellate attorneys’ fees, the amount frequently is set by order in the lower tribunal at the direction of the appellate court. An order determining the amount of appellate attorneys’ fees also is subject to review by motion in the appellate court. As in each of the previous examples, a party who is aggrieved by an order of the lower tribunal taxing costs or assessing the amount of appellate attorneys’ fees may challenge the order by filing a motion for review in the appellate court.156
Before the record is transmitted, the lower tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction with the appellate courts to enter orders on all procedural matters except for the extension of any time period prescribed by the appellate rules. Rule 9.600(a) states that the lower tribunals may exercise their concurrent jurisdiction “subject to the control” of the appellate court.157 Although the Rule does not explain how an appellate court would exercise control over a procedural order of the lower tribunal, the logical procedure for challenging such an order would be to file a motion for review in the appellate court.
In some situations discussed above, the opportunity to seek review by motion is governed by a time limitation, while in other situations it is not. For example, there is a thirty-day time limit for filing a motion to review an order taxing costs or attorneys’ fees and all motions for review in dissolution-of-marriage cases,158 but there is no established time limit for filing a motion to review an order granting or denying a stay pending review or an order determining the issue of post-trial release in a criminal case.159 Because the time requirements for review by motion are not uniform, attorneys must examine the applicable rule in every case.
Motions for review of orders of the lower tribunal should meet the same requirements of form and content that apply to preparing and filing of appellate motions generally.
Footnotes
152. Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(f).
153. See Peacock v. State, 798 S.2d 909, 910 (Fla. Dist. App. 5th 2001) (treating a petition for writ of habeas corpus as a motion to review an order on a motion for post-trial release).
154. Fla. R. App. P. 9.600(c)(1).
155. Rule 9.600(c)(1) provides that in family-law matters “[t]he lower tribunal shall retain jurisdiction to enter and enforce orders awarding separate maintenance, child support, alimony” or other awards “necessary to protect the welfare and rights of any party pending appeal” including costs and attorneys’ fees. Review of such orders is by motion filed in the court within thirty days of rendition of the order. Id. 9.600(c)(3).
156. Id. 9.400(c).
157. Id. 9.600(a).
158. Id. 9.400(c). Likewise, Rule 9.600(c)(3) requires that a motion to review an order in a dissolution-of-marriage case must be filed in the appellate court within thirty days of rendition.
159. Id. 9.310(f); id. 9.140(g)(4).
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