SECTION I | LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES: TENNEY V. BRANDHOVE
The Court's reasoning is worth noting. It interpreted 1983's "person" language against a common law background of absolute legislative immunity from tort liability derived from English law and early American history. The Court also emphasized the policy underlying the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution,11 suggesting that it "was a reflection of political principles already firmly established in the States."12 Against this background the Court examined the legislative intent behind 1983 and concluded that it would be implausible to infer that Congress intended to overturn the historical tradition of legislative freedom by subjecting legislators to civil liability for acts performed while engaging in legislative activity.13 The Court noted: "We cannot believe that Congress-itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language before us."14
Despite the broad language of section 1983 and Justice Douglas' dissent,15 the result in Tenney is probably justified for its concern with the democratic process and the chilling effect potential litigation might have upon the independence of legislators. Tenney prevents any inquiry into legislative motive, no matter how allegedly corrupt, so long as the legislator is acting in a traditional legislative field. Thus, the remedies for such corruption must be the political process and the criminal laws.16
While Tenney establishes that legislators are absolutely immune from section 1983 damages liability under appropriate circumstances, it fails to delineate what those circumstances might be and what acts of such an individual are protected. Tenney tells us that a legislative committee's investigation is within the field to which absolute immunity attaches,17 but it does not address the question of whether legislative employees or local legislatures such as city councils are within the sphere of absolute immunity. Tenney also gives no real indication of the standards which courts should use in distinguishing between traditional and nontraditional legislative fields. Finally, and more generally, Tenney leaves open the question of which other governmental officials might be absolutely immune because of a similar background of absolute immunity.
Footnotes
Investigations, whether by standing or special committees, are an established part of representative government.... To find that a committee's investigation has exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive. The present case does not present such a situation. Id. at 377-78.
You might need to reference it during your pursuit of justice.
For instance, you might need to examine this passage in order to protect yourself from judges/lawyers/organizations who break the law (see this example of a Florida judge who outright committed perjury).
Nevertheless – and as always – please get the justice you deserve.
Sincerely,
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