Legal Standards of Review
– The Established Citations –
Abuse of Discretion

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision whether to draw an adverse inference based on destruction of evidence. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 745 (8th Cir.2003). An adverse inference is appropriate only when, among other things, the party seeking the inference can show that once-extant records were destroyed “to suppress the truth,” and that the records would have favored its case.

A district court's "decision to alter or amend judgment is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 507 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess Assocs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 1985)). A district court's denial of a motion for leave to amend is reviewed under the same abuse of discretion standard. See Laurie v. Ala. Court of Criminal Appeals, 256 F.3d 1266, 1269(11th Cir. 2001).

We review denials of Rule 59(e) motions for an abuse of discretion. Thomas v. Farmville Mfg. Co., 705 F.2d 1307, 1307 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam). The district court's denial of the Rule 59(e) motion based on a miscomprehension of the law was an abuse of discretion. United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir.2008). However, we affirm the denial on the merits. See Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 613 (11th Cir.1995) (“[W]e may affirm the district court's decision on any adequate ground, even if it is other than the one on which the court actually relied.”).

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a motion to amend. Henson v. Columbus Bank Trust Co., 770 F.2d 1566, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985). A district court's discretion to dismiss a complaint without leave to amend "is `severely restrict[ed]' by Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), which directs that leave to amend `shall be freely given when justice so requires.'" Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).

We review a district court’s discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir.2003). We also review a district court’s decision not to appoint counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.2004).

"Whether the facts as found suffice to render the plaintiff a `prevailing party' is a legal question reviewed de novo." Church of Scientology, 2 F.3d at 1513. Finally, a district court's determination that a party has prevailed for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.

This court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for civil contempt under the abuse of discretion standard. See Jordan v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Upon appellate review, a civil contempt order may be upheld only if the proof of the defendant's contempt is clear and convincing.

We "give great deference to a district court's interpretation of its local rules" and review a district court's application of local rules for an abuse of discretion. Quick v. Peoples Bank of Cullman County, 993 F.2d 793, 798 (11th Cir. 1993); Clark v. Housing Auth. of Alma, 971 F.2d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1992).

We review the district court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment action for abuse of discretion. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289-90, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995).

In sum, we conclude that Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942), governs this declaratory judgment action and that district courts' decisions about the propriety of hearing declaratory judgment actions, which are necessarily bound up with their decisions about the propriety of granting declaratory relief, should be reviewed for abuse of discretion.

We review a district court’s discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir.2003). We also review a district court’s decision not to appoint counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.2004).

We review a denial of a request for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978), for abuse of discretion. United States v. Barsoum, 763 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2014).

We review the district court's decision to dismiss a case for failure to comply with the rules of the court for an abuse of discretion. Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.2005). "Discretion means the district court has a `range of choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.'"

Because the focal issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs’ suit for want of prosecution, we recount in detail the events leading up to the court’s order.

The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S. Ct. 252, 266, 70 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1981). "Factual determinations are reviewed for clear error." Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir.2001).

A determination of frivolity is best left to the district court, and we will review such determinations only for abuse of discretion. See McWilliams v. State of Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying abuse of discretion standard to review § 1915(e) frivolity dismissal); Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). But see McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying de novo standard to review § 1915(e)(2) claims based on changes to statute by PLRA).

A grant of an injunction may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion by the district court. United States v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450, 1458 (11th Cir. 1986).

The defendants argue, on the other hand, that we should review the decision of the district court only for abuse of discretion.

We agree with the defendants. The principle of international comity applied in this case is an abstention doctrine. Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004).

We review the district court's denial of a motion only for joinder for abuse of discretion. See Alexander v. Fulton County, Georgia, 207 F.3d 1303, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000). The district court has broad discretion to join parties or not and that decision will not be overturned as long as it falls within the district court's range of choices.

This court has historically in unpublished opinions reviewed a denial of coram nobis relief for abuse of discretion, see Warton v. United States, 971 F.2d 756 (11th Cir. 1992), and following the practice in other circuits we deem that to be the proper standard of review — keeping in mind that an error of law is an abuse of discretion per se. See Fleming v. United States, 146 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Camacho-Bordes, 94 F.3d 1168, 1173 (8th Cir. 1996).

“Abuse-of-discretion review of the likelihood of a miscarriage of justice is analogous to the abuse-of-discretion review of Rule 11 sanctions... In the present circumstances, where the subject of our review for an abuse of discretion is an appellate court's conclusion that a threatened miscarriage of justice is sufficient to justify recalling the mandate, I believe that we similarly must give some deference to the Court of Appeals's preliminary analysis that there may have been a misapplication of a legal standard, even though we would not defer to it if we were addressing the ultimate question on the merits, whether a trial court had committed legal error.”

We review the district court's grant of a new trial for abuse of discretion. See Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689 F.2d 964, 973 (11th Cir. 1982).

We review the denial of a petition to proceed in forma pauperis for abuse of discretion, Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 (11th Cir.2004), but we review interpretations of the Act de novo, Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir.2004). We review the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Forsyth Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir.2011).

After ruling that AHA could recover 41% of its proven damages, the district court denied AHA's request for prejudgment interest on its damages award. AHA argues that the court erred in this regard. We review the district court's decision on whether to award prejudgment interest for abuse of discretion. Insurance Co. of North America v. M/V Ocean Lynx, 901 F.2d 934, 942 (11th Cir. 1990).

(Ohio law applied to determine common law marriage).⁵ Since the domestic relations issue here arose in the determination of the right to receive benefits under FEGLI, a federal statute, the district court erred to the extent its decision not to grant the motion to reconsider relied upon its inclination not to review domestic relations issues when state law provides the rule of decision. However, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that the evidence would not be considered because it was not newly discovered and its credibility was doubtful.

⁵ Although the appropriate standard of review is generally whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, when the lower court rejects an application under Rule 59(e) based upon an erroneous legal doctrine, our standard of review is the same as in other cases of legal error.

Mr. Perkins argues that the district court was obligated to recuse sua sponte and that the district court erred when it denied Mr. Perkins’s pro se motion to recuse before his sentencing hearing. We review these arguments under the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir.2004).

While it may be true that sound administration of the Declaratory Judgment Act calls for the exercise of "judicial discretion, hardened by experience into rule," Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, at 293, proper application of the abuse of discretion standard on appellate review can, we think, provide appropriate guidance to district courts.

This, accompanied by the reasons explained below, leads to our conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion by the district court denying Cano Rule 60(b) relief.

We review a district court's denial of a Rule 60(b)(3) motion for abuse of discretion. Cox Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc. v. CTI, Inc., 478 F.3d 1303, 1314 (11th Cir.2007).

We review the district court's order for abuse of discretion, and we are bound by the district court's findings unless clearly erroneous. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2761, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977); Lee v. Anniston City School Sys., 737 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1984).

A court's decision to deny sanctions under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's inherent power is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005); Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1998). A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or bases the decision "upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous." Cordoba, 419 F.3d at 1180 (citation omitted).

We will not disturb a district court's decision not to order separate trials absent an abuse of discretion. See Itel Corp. v. Cups Coal Co., 707 F.2d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 1983).

We will reverse the lower court's denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment only for abuse of discretion, see Fla. Physician's Ins. Co. v. Ehlers, 8 F.3d 780, 783 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Gibbs v. Air Canada, 810 F.2d 1529, 1537 (11th Cir. 1987) and Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1020 (11th Cir. 1982)), and we have cautioned that "appellant cannot prevail simply because the [bankruptcy court] properly could have vacated its order." Solaroll Shade Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1977)). Instead, to show an abuse of discretion, the "appellant must demonstrate a justification so compelling that the [lower] court was required to vacate its order."

We review an approval of a settlement agreement under the abuse of discretion standard. See Leverso v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., 18 F.3d 1527, 1531 (11th Cir. 1994).

We review a dismissal on Rule 8 shotgun pleading grounds for an abuse of discretion. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office , 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Shotgun pleadings violate Rule 8, which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), by "fail[ing] to one degree or another... to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests."

It is settled that if a party submits materially false evidence in a civil proceeding, whether in discovery or at trial, the court has the discretion to strike the offending party's claim or defense as a sanction. See Long v. Swofford, 805 So.2d 882 (Fla.3d DCA 2001)

Appellant, Betty K Agencies, LTD. ("Betty K"), challenges the district court's sua sponte order dismissing with prejudice its maritime claims against Appellees Tidal Wave Limited ("Tidal Wave") and M/V MONADA ("MONADA"). Because the district court dismissed the case with prejudice as a sanction for failure to answer a counterclaim and perfect service of process, without finding that Betty K acted with willful or contumacious disregard for court rules, and without finding that lesser sanctions were somehow inadequate, we vacate the district court's Dismissal Order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Here, the district court ignored the unambiguous standard that has governed dismissals with prejudice. The Dismissal Order merely recites the rules Betty K purportedly violated, and makes no finding that Betty K's seemingly inadvertent and isolated mistake was willful or contumacious. Moreover, the district court failed to find, explicitly or implicitly, that lesser sanctions were inadequate to correct Betty K's untimely filing. The district court's failure to make either finding was a clear abuse of discretion.

Mr. Tietig argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying a fifth extension and by refusing to consider the untimely responses' to defendants’ motions for summary judgment. We cannot agree.

When we review a district court’s decision under the abuse of discretion. standard