Earn 1,000 Book Points for every sample document (and/or template) that you sell! Help thousands of other litigants who [will] find themselves in your shoes!Sell™ Now
SECTION VI | PERSONS PROTECTED BY JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Judges at all levels who act in a judicial capacity106 are protected by absolute immunity. This includes justices of the peace,107 municipal referees,108 and presumably judges at both the trial and appellate level.109 Occasionally it becomes necessary to decide whether what is formally called a court in fact exercises a judicial function; if it does not, but is, for example, "entirely legislative and administrative," then its members are not considered judges - even if they are so called - and thus are not protected by absolute immunity.110 Some courts have applied absolute immunity to members of quasi-judicial agencies, comparing them functionally with judges even though they are clearly not judges. This questionable tendency is especially marked in connection with parole boards and with courts emphasizing their quasi-judicial functions as well as their relation "to the operation of a state judicial and penal system.111
There is language in some of the cases suggesting that acts of persons "in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process" are protected by absolute judicial immunity.112 This reasoning has been applied to
clerks of court,113
sheriffs,114
probation officers,115 court reporters,116 and
court-appointed medical examiners.117
However, as the Fourth Circuit has pointed out in McCray v. Maryland,118 this reasoning is flawed because the functions of absolute immunity for judges are not applicable to these other officials who do not make judicial decisions. It makes considerably more sense to hold that clerks and others are protected only by a qualified immunity.119 They should, however, be protected by an absolute judicial immunity when they act pursuant to court order or direction.120 This exception to the qualified immunity rule, acknowledged by the Fourth Circuit in McCray and suggested by the Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson121 is fair and prevents disruption of the judicial process.122 Furthermore, it explains the result in many of the cases purporting to apply an absolute immunity rule.123
This approach is questionable in view of Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1974), in which the Supreme Court applied only a qualified immunity to school board members though they acted in a quasi-judicial capacity.
112Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1970).113Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 460 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1972); Marcedes v. Barrett, 453 F.2d 391 (3rd Cir. 1971); Davis v. McAteer, 431 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1970).114People ex rel. Giles v. Thomas, 464 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1972).115Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970).116Stewart v. Minnick, 409 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1969).117Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970).118 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972).119 The Eighth Circuit followed McCray in Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir. 1973).120 In Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3rd Cir. 1969), the court emphasized both the "manifest unfairness of subjecting one to suit as a consequence of action taken at the direction of officials over whom the individual actor has no power or control," and the likelihood of dismissal if the defendant refuses to comply. See also Smith v. Martin, 542 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1976); Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1972); Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1968).121 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975). The Court applied a qualified immunity to a state psychiatrist after it observed that he did not contend he acted pursuant to courtorder in keeping the plaintiff confined.122 Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1239 (1955). See also Hazo v. Geltz, 537 F.2d 747 (3rd Cir. 1976), where a deputy sheriff was sued under 1983 for allegedly causing an invalid levy against plaintiff's personal property pursuant to a default judgment. In remanding, the courtheld that only a qualified immunity would apply unless evidence of "direct judicial supervision," not simply administrative convenience, was shown. Id. at 751.123 See, e.g., Smith v. Rosenbaum, 460 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1972); People ex rel. Giles v. Thomas, 464 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1972).
Congratulations! You're now booked up on Section VI from DePaul University's 1978 Law Review article on Judicial Immunity!
You might need to reference it during your pursuit of justice.
