In Stump, a document containing a petition to have a tubal ligation performed on a minor was presented to Judge Stump by the minor's mother.24 She stated in the petition that her daughter was 15 years old and somewhat retarded, although the girl had attended public school and had been promoted with her class each year.25 The petition also stated that the minor had stayed out overnight on several occasions with youths and older men, and that as a result of this behavior and her low mentality a tubal ligation would be in the child's best interests and would prevent unfortunate circumstances from occurring.26 The judge approved and signed the petition in an ex parte proceeding without a hearing, and without notice to either the girl or to anyone on her behalf.27 The operation subsequently took place.
Two years later, and after her marriage, the girl discovered that she had been sterilized.28 She brought a section 1983 action for damages against the judge, claiming a deprivation of her constitutional rights.29
The Supreme Court in a five-to-three decision held that the judge was absolutely immune from damages under the doctrine of judicial immunity.30 The Court had no difficulty classifying the action as a judicial function: It stated that state judges are often called upon in their official capacity to approve petitions relating to the "affairs of minors," and that Judge Stump was "acting as a county circuit court judge."31
The normal judicial function factor of the definition was broadly applied by the majority: Approving a petition for a tubal ligation was equated with the routine approval of a petition relating to the affairs of a minor.32 Thus, the act in question need not be performed often or even at all in order to be considered a normal judicial function.33 Although less clearly developed in Stump, the second factor - dealing with the judge in his judicial capacity - was applied just as broadly. According to the Court, because the mother presented the sterilization petition to the judge and he signed it, the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.34 Under this reading, a judge's approval of a mother's petition to lock her daughter in the attic would be considered a judicial act merely because the mother had submitted her petition to the judge in his official capacity.35
Such a broad interpretation of "judicial act" demonstrates how far the Supreme Court is willing to go in upholding the doctrine of judicial immunity, even in the face of gross unfairness in the judicial process.36 Although Stump makes clear how paramount and unyielding the policies behind judicial immunity are, it explains neither the precise meaning of a judicial act, nor how to apply the majority's definition to a given act.
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Source: (Fordham Law Review. Joseph Romagnoli)


