Sparkman involved alleged violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights,3 which were said to have occurred during the process culminating in Linda Sparkman's involuntary sterilization. Prior to the operation, the sterilization had been approved by Harold Stump, a judge in an Indiana court of general jurisdiction, after a petition by Ms. Sparkman's mother to have her daughter sterilized was filed in his court. The petition was granted the day it was presented, in an ex parte proceeding without a hearing. Neither the petition nor the order were ever filed or recorded; no notice was given the daughter; nor was a guardian ad litem appointed. The operation was performed seven days later after Ms. Sparkman was told she was to have her appendix removed. Two years later, after Ms. Sparkman's marriage, when she consulted a doctor concerning her inability to conceive, she was informed that she had been sterilized.4
In response, Ms. Sparkman and her husband filed a federal action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 19855 against Judge Stump, together with pendent state claims for assault and battery and malpractice against her mother, the mother's attorney, the doctors involved in the surgery, and the hospital where it was performed. Judge Stump's motion to dismiss based on the defense of judicial immunity was granted in the district court and the entire action was then dismissed.6
A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the district court, holding that the defense of judicial immunity was not available to Judge Stump, first because he had acted extrajudicially in ordering the sterilization and second, because the act in question was performed without jurisdiction.7 The Supreme Court, however, in a five-three decision, again reversed, holding that the judicial immunity defense did protect Judge Stump.8 The majority and minority views in Sparkman represent two historical positions on the breadth of protection which should be afforded under the judicial immunity privilege, and these opinions must necessarily be examined in the light of this history.
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