FCHR CORRUPTION
Michelle Wilson v. The Florida Commission on Human Relations
Chapter 3: Trial Court

All Pertinent Documents

ITEM 301 | COVER SHEET

FORM 1.997. CIVIL COVER SHEET

The civil cover sheet and the information contained in it neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other documents as required by law. This form must be filed by the plaintiff or petitioner with the Clerk of Court for the purpose of reporting uniform data pursuant to section 25.075, Florida Statutes. (See instructions for completion.)

I. CASE STYLE

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
MICHELLE WILSON Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, Defendant.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case #: 2023 CA 001569 Judge: ______________

II. AMOUNT OF CLAIM

Please indicate the estimated amount of the claim, rounded to the nearest dollar. The estimated amount of the claim is requested for data collection and clerical processing purposes only. The amount of the claim shall not be used for any other purpose.

☐ $8,000 or less
☐ $8,001 - $30,000
☐ $30,001- $50,000
☐ $50,001- $75,000
☐ $75,001 - $100,000
☒ over $100,000.00

III. TYPE OF CASE

(If the case fits more than one type of case, select the most definitive category.) If the most descriptive label is a subcategory (is indented under a broader category), place an x on both the main category and subcategory lines.

CIRCUIT CIVIL

☐ Condominium
☐ Contracts and indebtedness
☐ Eminent domain
☐ Auto negligence
☐ Negligence — other

☐ Business governance
☐ Business torts
☐ Environmental/Toxic tort
☐ Third party indemnification
☐ Construction defect
☐ Mass tort
☐ Negligent security
☐ Nursing home negligence
☐ Premises liability — commercial
☐ Premises liability — residential

☐ Products liability
☐ Real Property/Mortgage foreclosure

☐ Commercial foreclosure
☐ Homestead residential foreclosure
☐ Non-homestead residential foreclosure
☐ Other real property actions

☐ Professional malpractice

☐ Malpractice — business
☐ Malpractice — medical
☐ Malpractice — other professional

☒ Other

☐ Antitrust/Trade regulation
☐ Business transactions
☒ Constitutional challenge — statute or ordinance
☐ Constitutional challenge — proposed amendment
☐ Corporate trusts
☐ Discrimination — employment or other
☐ Insurance claims
☐ Intellectual property
☐ Libel/Slander
☐ Shareholder derivative action
☐ Securities litigation
☐ Trade secrets
☐ Trust litigation

COUNTY CIVIL

☐ Small Claims up to $8,000
☐ Civil
☐ Real property/Mortgage foreclosure
☐ Replevins
☐ Evictions

☐ Residential Evictions
☐ Non-residential Evictions

☐ Other civil (non-monetary)

COMPLEX BUSINESS COURT

This action is appropriate for assignment to Complex Business Court as delineated and mandated by the Administrative Order. Yes ☐ No ☒

IV. REMEDIES SOUGHT (check all that apply):

☒ Monetary;
☒ Nonmonetary declaratory or injunctive relief;
☒ Punitive

V. NUMBER OF CAUSES OF ACTION: [ ]

(Specify)

VI. IS THIS CASE A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT?

☐ yes
☒ no

VII. HAS NOTICE OF ANY KNOWN RELATED CASE BEENFILED?

☒ no
☐ yes If “yes,” list all related cases by name, case number, and court.

VIII. IS JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN COMPLAINT?

☒ yes
☐ no

IX. DOES THIS CASE INVOLVE ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE?

☐ yes
☒ no

I CERTIFY that the information I have provided in this cover sheet is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that I have read and will comply with the requirements of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.425.

Signature:	s/ Richard E Johnson Johnson	Fla. Bar #	858323
	Attorney or party		(Bar # if attorney)

Richard E Johnson Johnson		05/25/2023
(type or print name)		Date

Wilson v FCHR, et al
© December 2020

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 302 | CIVIL COMPLAINT

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
MICHELLE WILSON Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, Defendant.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case #: 2023 CA 001569

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff sues Defendants and states:

JURISDICTION, VENUE, PARTIES

1. This action for monetary damages, for declaratory and injunctive relief, and for other equitable and ancillary relief is brought under the Florida Constitution, Article I §§ 9 (due process), 21 (access to courts), 22 (jury trial); Article II, § 3 (separation of powers); and the First (right to petition) and Fourteenth (due process) Amendments of the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. These claims are, individually, valued in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00), exclusive of costs, interest, & attorney’s fees.

2. Plaintiff Michelle Wilson is a female citizen of the United States and a citizen and resident of the State of Florida and has so resided at all times material hereto.

3. Defendant Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) is a department of the State of Florida with its principal place of business in Tallahassee, Florida. FCHR is a public body corporate, appointed by the Governor, which, collectively, has authority to hire and fire the executive director. It is sued under the Florida Constitution for equitable relief.

4. Defendant Cheyanne Costilla is Executive Director of the Florida Commission on Human Relations and, as such, is that agency’s chief executive officer. She is sued for prospective equitable relief in her official capacity and for monetary damages in her individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Her principal place of business is in Leon County, Florida.

5. Substantially all the transactions and occurrences herein occurred in Leon County, Florida.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

6. All conditions precedent have been fulfilled, waived, or excused.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

7. Plaintiff Michelle Wilson worked for seventeen years for Defendant FCHR, beginning in 2003.

8. After starting in a low-ranking position, Plaintiff worked her way up to Executive Director, the agency’s chief executive position, serving in that capacity for the last nine years of her tenure.

9. There came a point at which members of the Commission itself, which was, collectively, Plaintiffs boss, began demanding that Plaintiff perform illegal acts.

10. For example, and without limitation, members of the Commission, including one who had more than a score of discrimination charges against his business, began demanding that Plaintiff issue “no-cause” determinations against employment discrimination claims that had not yet been investigated.

11. Both a Florida Statute and a binding administrative rule required that a charge be investigated before being given a “cause” or “no cause” determination. Even so, these Commissioners, instead of seeking amendments to the statute and the rule, simply demanded that Plaintiff act in violation of them.

12. Plaintiff insisted on following the law.

13. FCHR fired Plaintiff on October 15, 2020, because of her refusal to violate laws, rules, ad regulations.

14. Plaintiff filed a formal Whistleblower Charge on December 14, 2020, taking care to address the charge to both FCHR and the Office of the Chief Inspector General (OIG). The pertinent statute gives both agencies equal jurisdiction over receiving and processing whistleblower charges. §112.31895(l)(a), Florida Statutes.

15. In the email transmitting the Charge, Plaintiff pointed out FCHR’s obvious conflict in passing judgment on its own firing decision and noted the authority of OIG to act instead of FCHR.

16. Even so, FCHR kept the charge itself.

17. The Charge was drafted by Plaintiff, who had run the agency for nine years, and by a board-certified labor and employment lawyer with more than 30 years’ experience before FCHR. It easily met all the requirements of a whistleblower charge under Florida law.

18. Plaintiff had no communication from FCHR for 144 days.

19. At that time, FCHR wrote Plaintiff, saying that the Charge was not adequate and that she had an opportunity to amend.

20. Plaintiff’s team sought details concerning what FCHR thought to be wrong or inadequate, but was able to extract only contradictory, vague, and senseless comments for guidance on what to amend.

21. It became apparent that FCHR was not going to be able to rise above its conflict of interest in processing the Charge.

22. That would be disappointing, but still workable, because under the controlling statutory framework, FCHR was required to issue a positive or negative determination on every charge, and, unlike discrimination charges, a negatively determined whistleblower charge could still go on to circuit court.

23. But rather than making a determination of any kind, FCHR chose not to process or investigate Plaintiff’s charge and thus to issue no determination, positive or negative.

24. Without a determination, Plaintiff lacked a “ticket” to get into court.

25. Plaintiff filed an appeal in the First District Court of Appeal, challenging the authority of FCHR to withhold a determination under the operative statute, but also raising state and federal constitutional issues of separation of powers, conflict of interest, due process, access to courts, and right to trial by jury.

26. The appeals court failed to acknowledge or address any of the constitutional issues, even on rehearing, and found FCHR to have an “inherent” power to decline jurisdiction over a whistleblower charge.

27. Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this plenary action to force consideration of her constitutional claims.

28. Plaintiff has had to retain counsel to vindicate her rights in this matter and owes a reasonable attorney’s fee.

COUNT I
U.S. CONSTITUTION
FIRST AMENDMENT - RIGHT TO PETITION
42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against Costilla, official and individual capacities)

29. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-28.

30. Defendant Costilla violated Plaintiffs First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances by refusing to honor Plaintiff’s right to a determination on her whistleblower charge when such a determination serves as Plaintiff’s ticket to her statutorily guaranteed judicial proceeding on that whistleblower charge.

31. Plaintiff’s rights to petition government through judicial proceedings were clearly established.

32. The acts of Costilla as described herein were taken under color of state law, custom, or usage.

33. The acts of Costilla as described herein were purposeful and arise from an official policy or custom.

34. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that no state shall deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of access to courts as part of the right to petition government for the redress of grievances — a right which stands at the very apex of constitutional protection when exercised, as here, in political speech aimed at protesting the restrictive conduct of government on matters of the gravest public concern.

35. The acts of Costilla violated the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

36. Plaintiff has suffered damages because of the Defendant’s unlawful actions.

COUNT II
U.S. CONSTITUTION
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - DUE PROCESS - NEUTRAL TRIBUNAL
42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against Costilla, official and individual capacities)

37. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-28

38. Defendant Costilla violated Plaintiff’s right to due process of law by causing FCHR to review and pass upon the propriety of its own decision to fire Plaintiff, thereby denying Plaintiff a neutral tribunal, which is an essential element of due process.

39. Plaintiff had warned Costilla at the outset upon submitting her charge that FCHR had a conflict of interest in passing upon its own decision and even suggested one of several places (Chief Inspector General) to which FCHR could have referred the charge for processing and determination.

40. FCHR has previously outsourced similar determinations to the Florida Attorney General to avoid conflicts of interest.

41. Plaintiff’s right to a neutral tribunal was clearly established.

42. The acts of Costilla as described herein were taken under color of state law, custom, or usage.

43. The acts of Costilla as described herein were purposeful and arise from an official policy or custom.

44. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. There can be no due process where the officers of a tribunal judge their own conduct.

45. The acts of Costilla violated the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

46. Plaintiff has suffered damages because of the Defendant’s unlawful actions.

COUNT III
U.S. CONSTITUTION
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - DUE PROCESS
42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against Costilla, official and individual capacities)

47. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-28.

48. Defendant Costilla violated Plaintiffs right to due process of law by capriciously and without standards sweeping away Plaintiffs valuable right to proceed in court on her whistleblower claim.

49. The Legislature established a duty for FCHR to issue a determination on every whistleblower charge presented to that agency. That determination serves as the charging party’s ticket to court. There is no access without it. FCHR arrogated to itself the power to rewrite the statute to give itself power to refuse to investigate or process a charge FCHR in its sole discretion deems inadequate.

50. FCHR has no objective criteria nor any sort of standards written - the agency merely operates on unarticulated, subjective feelings, whims, and prejudice in determining which charges not to investigate and thus to strangle in infancy.

51. Plaintiff’s right to due process was clearly established.

52. The acts of Costilla as described herein were taken under color of state law, custom, or usage.

53. The acts of Costilla as described herein were purposeful and arise from an official policy or custom.

54. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. There can be no due process where rights are “capriciously swept away on the wings of luck and happenstance.” Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 577.

55. The acts of Costilla violated the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

56. Plaintiff has suffered damages because of the Defendant’s unlawful actions.

COUNT IV
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
Article I, § 9 - DUE PROCESS
(Against FCHR)

57. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-28.

58. Defendant FCHR violated Plaintiff’s right to due process of law by capriciously and without standards sweeping away Plaintiffs valuable right to proceed in court on her whistleblower claim.

59. The Legislature established a duty for FCHR to issue a determination on every whistleblower charge presented to that agency. That determination serves as the charging party’s ticket to court. There is no access without it. FCHR arrogated to itself the power to rewrite the statute to give itself power to refuse to investigate or process a charge FCHR in its sole discretion deems inadequate.

60. FCHR has no objective criteria nor any sort of standards written - the agency merely operates on unarticulated, subjective feelings, whims, and prejudice in determining which charges not to investigate and thus to strangle in infancy.

61. Plaintiff’s right to due process was clearly established.

62. Article I, § 9 of the Florida Constitution guarantees that, “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”

63. The acts of FCHR violated Article I, § 9 of the Florida Constitution.

64. Plaintiff is entitled to relief because of the Defendant’s unlawful actions.

COUNT V
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
Article I, § 21 - Right of Access to Court
(Against FCHR)

65. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-28.

66. Defendant FCHR violated Plaintiffs right of access to court by placing illegitimate and insuperable obstacles in her path to vindication of her rights to litigate her whistleblower claims in circuit court.

67. The Legislature established a duty for FCHR to issue a determination on every whistleblower charge presented to that agency. That determination serves as the charging party’s ticket to court. There is no access without it. FCHR arrogated to itself the power to rewrite the statute to give itself power to refuse to investigate or process a charge FCHR in its sole discretion deems inadequate.

68. FCHR has no objective criteria nor any sort of standards written - the agency merely operates on unarticulated, subjective feelings, whims, and prejudice in determining which charges not to investigate and thus to strangle in infancy.

69. Plaintiffs right to access to court was clearly established.

70. Article I, § 21 of the Florida Constitution guarantees that, “The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”

71. The acts of FCHR violated Article I, § 21 of the Florida Constitution.

72. Plaintiff is entitled to relief because of the Defendant’s unlawful actions.

COUNT VI
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
Article I, § 22 - Trial by Jury
(Against FCHR)

73. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-28.

74. Defendant FCHR violated Plaintiff’s right to trial by jury by capriciously and without standards sweeping away Plaintiffs valuable right to proceed in court on her whistleblower claim.

75. As an administrative agency of the executive branch, FCHR is not authorized to resolve any determination of a party’s right to the monetary damages for emotional distress that the whistleblower statute provides. By blocking Plaintiff’s access to a court that could pass on such issues, FCHR violated Plaintiffs right to trial by jury.

76. The Legislature established a duty for FCHR to issue a determination on every whistleblower charge presented to that agency. That determination serves as the charging party’s ticket to court. There is no access without it. FCHR arrogated to itself the power to rewrite the statute to give itself power to refuse to investigate or process a charge FCHR in its sole discretion deems inadequate.

77. FCHR has no objective criteria nor any sort of standards written - the agency merely operates on unarticulated, subjective feelings, whims, and prejudice in determining which charges not to investigate and thus to strangle in infancy.

78. Plaintiff’s right to due process was clearly established.

79. Article I, § 22 of the Florida Constitution guarantees that, “The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate.”

80. The acts of FCHR violated Article I, § 22 of the Florida Constitution.

81. Plaintiff is entitled to relief because of the Defendant’s unlawful actions.

COUNT VII
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
Article II, § 3 - SEPARATION OF POWERS
(Against FCHR)

82. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-28.

83. Defendant FCHR violated the Florida Constitution’s mandate of separation of powers, under which no branch of government may exercise the powers reserved to the others.

84. The language of Article II, § 3, is, “[t]he powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided therein. “

85. By effectively amending the public whistleblower statute to grant itself an unlimited and undefined exception to the mandate to issue a determination in every case to allow each case to go to court, FCHR unlawfully exercised the powers of the legislative branch.

86. By effectively amending the whistleblower statute, the Florida Constitution, and the common law to allow itself to make final determinations on claims for emotional distress damages and other unliquidated damages, FCHR arrogated to itself the powers of the judicial branch.

87. FCHR has no objective criteria nor any sort of standards written - the agency merely operates on unarticulated, subjective feelings, whims, and prejudice in determining which charges not to investigate and thus to strangle in infancy.

88. The acts of FCHR violated Article II, § 3 of the Florida Constitution. Plaintiff is entitled to relief because of the Defendant’s unlawful actions.

PRAYER OF RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief:

a) that process issue and this Court take jurisdiction over this case;

b) award a declaratory judgment against Defendants and for the Plaintiff;

c) award judgment for damages against Defendant Costilla and for the Plaintiff;

d) award Plaintiff compensatory damages for garden variety emotional distress in an amount to be determined by the enlightened conscience of the jury;

e) award Plaintiff punitive damages against Costilla, individually, in an amount to be determined by the enlightened conscience of the jury;

f) enter an injunction for the Plaintiff, compelling FCHR to issue a determination on Plaintiff’s whistleblower claim;

g) judgment against Defendant and for Plaintiff permanently enjoining Defendant from future violations of law enumerated herein;

h) award Plaintiff prejudgment interest;

i) award Plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs of litigation;

j) award Plaintiff such other and further relief as is appropriate.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Respectfully submitted this 25th day of May 2023,

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Richard E. Johnson
Richard E. Johnson
Florida Bar No. 858323
Law Office of Richard E. Johnson
314 West Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Telephone: 850/ 425-1997
Facsimile: 850/ 561-0836
rick@rej-law.com

Counsel for Appellant

Wilson v FCHR, et al
© December 2020

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 303 | SUMMONS (CHEYANNE COSTILLA, FCHR AGENCY HEAD)

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
MICHELLE WILSON Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, Defendant.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case #: 2023 CA 001569

SUMMONS

THE STATE OF FLORIDA:

To Each Sheriff of the State:

YOU ARE COMMANDED to serve this summons and a copy of the complaint or petition in this action on Defendant:

CHEYANNE COSTILLA
FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS
4075 Esplanade Way,
Unit 110,
Tallahassee, FL 32399

Each defendant is required to serve written defenses to the complaint or petition on Richard E. Johnson, Plaintiffs attorney, whose address is 314 West Jefferson St., Tallahassee, FL 32301, within 20 days after service of this summons on that defendant, exclusive of the day of service, and to file the original of the defenses with the clerk of this court, either before serve on plaintiffs attorney or immediately thereafter. If a defendant fails to do so, a default will be entered against that defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint or petition.

DATED on June 6, 2023.

		By:	CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 06/06/2023
		Deputy Clerk

Wilson v FCHR, et al
© December 2020

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 304 | SUMMONS (DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES)

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
MICHELLE WILSON Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, Defendant.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case #: 2023 CA 001569

SUMMONS

THE STATE OF FLORIDA:

To Each Sheriff of the State:

YOU ARE COMMANDED to serve this summons and a copy of the complaint or petition in this action on Defendant:

DIVISION OF RISK MANAGEMENT
Department of Financial Services
200 East Gaines Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399

DATED on June 6, 2023.

		By:	CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 06/06/2023
		Deputy Clerk

Wilson v FCHR, et al
© December 2020

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 305 | SUMMONS (FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS)

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
MICHELLE WILSON Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, Defendant.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case #: 2023 CA 001569

SUMMONS

THE STATE OF FLORIDA:

To Each Sheriff of the State:

YOU ARE COMMANDED to serve this summons and a copy of the complaint or petition in this action on Defendant:

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS
4075 Esplanade Way,
Unit 110,
Tallahassee, FL 32399

DATED on June 6, 2023.

		By:	CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 06/06/2023
		Deputy Clerk

Wilson v FCHR, et al
© December 2020

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 306 | DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
MICHELLE WILSON Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, Defendant.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case #: 2023 CA 001569

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

COME NOW, Defendants, FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS and CHEYANNE COSTILLA, and file this Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(b)(1). Plaintiff raised the same constitutional claims asserted in this action in a prior appeal to the First District Court of Appeal. Because the First DCA has already ruled on these issues, and because Plaintiff incorporated her appeal to the First DCA into her Complaint, her claims are barred by collateral estoppel. In support of this Motion, Defendants state the following:

I. FACTS ALLEGED

Plaintiff, Michelle Wilson, worked for Defendant, Florida Commission on Human Relations, and at the time of her separation served as its Executive Director. [Cmplt. H8]. Plaintiff was dismissed on October 15, 2020, and believed the cause of her dismissal was her “refusal to violate law, rules, ad [sic] regulations.” [Cmplt. H13]. Plaintiff therefore filed a whistleblower charge on December 14, 2020. [Cmplt. H14]. Plaintiff believes that her whistleblower charge “easily met all the requirements of a whistleblower charge under Florida Law” because she, “who had run the agency for nine years,” prepared it along with her counsel, “a board-certified labor and employment lawyer with more than 30 years’ experience before FCHR.” [Cmplt. U17]. FCHR disagreed and informed Plaintiff that the charge was inadequate, giving her an opportunity to amend. [Cmplt. H19]. Ultimately, FCHR did initiate an investigation into Plaintiffs charge and did not issue a determination. [Cmplt. H23].¹ Plaintiff appealed FCHR’s action to the First District Court of Appeal, “challenging the authority of FCHR to withhold a determination under the operative statute, but also raising state and federal constitutional issues of separation of powers, conflict of interest, due process, access to courts, and right to trial by jury.” [Cmplt. U25]. The First DCA affirmed FCHR’s action, “even on rehearing, and found FCHR to have an ‘inherent’ power to decline jurisdiction over a whistleblower charge.” [Cmplt. H26].² Plaintiff now files this action asserting the same constitutional claims that she argued to the First DCA.

II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff brings claims against Cheyanne Costilla, Executive Director of FCHR, in her official and individual capacities (Counts I-III) and against FCHR (Counts IV-VII). Plaintiff s claims here are not based on her dismissal. These are not wrongful termination or employment retaliation claims. Instead, Plaintiff raises seven (7) state and federal constitutional claims based on FCHR’s dismissal of her whistleblower charge, asserting that FCHR is “required to issue a positive or negative determination on every charge.” [Cmplt. H22].

Plaintiff asserts that FCHR’s failure to issue a determination violated her First Amendment right to petition (Count I), her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process (Counts II and III), and her state constitutional rights of due process (Count IV), access to court (Count V), trial by jury (Count VI), and separation of powers (Count VII). These are claims Plaintiff argued to the First DCA. [Cmplt. H25].

III. WBA FRAMEWORK

Florida law provides that employees and former employees who believe they have been subjected to retaliation by an employer after making a disclosure protected by the Whistle-blower’s Act (WBA) may “file a complaint alleging a prohibit personnel action”... with “the Office of the Chief Inspector General in the Executive Office of the Governor or the Florida Commission on Human Relations.” §112.31895(1X3), Fla. Stat. Thereafter, the WBA accords investigative power to the FCHR “to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that a prohibited action or a pattern of prohibited action has occurred, is occurring, or is to be taken.” §112.31895(2X3), Fla. Stat.

The form that a disclosure must take to invoke WBA protection is governed by section 112.3187(7), Florida Statutes. The substance requirement for a WBA disclosure is set forth at section 112.3187(5), Florida Statutes.

The First District Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that FCHR has no statutory authority to investigate and may dismiss a charge if it “does not meet the prima facie elements necessary to initiate the operation of the Act.” Stanton v. Florida Dept, of Health, 129 So. 3d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (affirming FCHR’s dismissal of a Charge because it did not describe a disclosure that would trigger the protection of the WBA); Tillery v. Florida Dept, of Juvenile Justice, 104 So. 3d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (affirming FCHR’s dismissal of a charge because it did not assert “when or to whom” a disclosure was made); Caldwell v. Florida Dept, of Elder Affairs, 121 So. 3d 1062, 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (affirming dismissal of charge by FCHR because allegations in the charge that the complainant contacted a federal investigator “to alert him to the condition of the Ombudsman program and the gross misfeasance and malfeasance that were occurring within” were conclusory and did not describe any act or suspected act of misfeasance or malfeasance”).

Where the FCHR dismisses a whistleblower charge without making a determination, that decision is appealable to the First District Court of Appeal. Fla. Stat. § 120.68.

IV. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Where a party challenges an administrative action by a state agency such as FCHR in state court and the state court renders a decision, that decision operates as res judicata and bars further constitutional claims challenging that administrative action. Gorin v. Osborne, 756 F.2d 834, 838 (11th Cir. 1985). Likewise, when a court “decides an issue necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the same issue on a different cause of action between the same parties.” Barrington v. Florida Dept, of Health,112 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2000).

V. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED

While res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses that typically should not be raised by motion to dismiss, Plaintiff specifically referenced the appeal of FCHR’s dismissal of her whistleblower charge to the First DCA in her Complaint, noting the constitutional issues she raised and the First DCA’s ruling. Thus, this Court may consider the First DCA’s ruling in deciding this motion. Duncan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 690 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla.1st DCA1997)

Each claim in this action is based on Plaintiff s contention that FCHR’s dismissal of her whistleblower charge was impermissible because every whistleblower charge FCHR receives must be investigated and result in a “determination giving the charging party a point of entry into court.” [Cmplt. H30 (Count I), H38 (Count II), H49 (Count III), H59 (Count IV), H67 (Count V), H76 (Count VI), H85 (Count VII)].

Plaintiff is incorrect. She made this argument to the First DCA, which disagreed, citing its prior rulings that the FCHR has inherent authority to dismiss a whistleblower charge. Indeed, the First DCA has repeatedly held that FCHR may dismiss a whistleblower charge and is not required to investigate it or issue a determination where the charge does not describe a protected disclosure that would trigger the antiretaliation provisions of the WBA. Plaintiff explicitly referenced the First DCA’s ruling in her Complaint. [Cmplt. H 26].

Because an element necessary to each of Plaintiff s claims - that Plaintiff was entitled to an investigation and determination of her whistle-blower charge - has already been decided to the contrary by the First DCA, Plaintiff s claims are all barred by collateral estoppel. Plaintiff s Complaint is due to be dismissed, with prejudice.

Respectfully submitted June 26, 2023.

/s/ Jamie Ito
JAMIE ITO
Florida Bar No. 13553
Jamie@itolaw.net
Ito Law, PLLC
411 Wilson Ave.
Tallahassee, FL 32303
(850) 284-9517

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal on all parties of record on June 26, 2023.

	/s/ Jamie Ito
	JAMIE ITO

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

¹ For clarity, while not explicitly identified in Plaintiff’s Complaint, FCHR issued a Notice of Dismissal on October 21, 2021.

² Wilson v. Florida Comm’n on Human Relations, 351 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), reh’g denied (Dec. 5, 2022).

ITEM 307 | PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
MICHELLE WILSON Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, Defendant.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case #: 2023 CA 001569

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

The gravamen of this motion to dismiss is that Plaintiff seeks an improper second bite at apple in violation of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. That claim is in error because Plaintiff, even now, has still not had her first bite at the apple. No court has ruled on the issues raised in the instant suit. That is the dispositive factor. It is of no consequence that the issues were raised in a prior proceeding in which the tribunal declined to reach them.

I. PRIOR PROCEEDING

The prior proceeding, Wilson v. Florida Commission on Human Relations, 351 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), (rehearing denied, December 5, 2022), was an appeal from the dismissal, without processing or investigation, of Plaintiff’s whistleblower complaint by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). The public whistleblower statute, at § 112.31895(3)(d), Florida Statutes, requires FCHR to investigate and make a determination on every whistleblower complaint. The FCHR determination, regardless of outcome, amounts to a ticket for the charging party to bring a case in circuit court. In this regard, a whistleblower charge differs from a charge of discrimination in that, for the latter, a timely negative finding by FCHR can block access to court. A whistleblower charge goes to court regardless of FCHR’s determination.

FCHR sought a means to escape the statutory mandate to investigate and make a determination in every case. The agency hit upon an “inherent power” to dismiss cases without investigation or determination if those cases appeared to be untimely, appear to fail to state a prima facie case, or to fall short in whatever other way FCHR determined to be fatal. Charging parties challenged these dismissals in a quartet of cases, all originating in Tallahassee and all filed by attorney Marie Mattox. Robinson v. Department of Health, 89 So.3d 1079, 1082-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Tillery v. Fla. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 104 So.3d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Stanton v. Florida Department of Health, 129 So.3d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); and Caldwell v. Florida Dept. Of Elder Affairs, 121 So.3d 1062, 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

These cases seemed legally erroneous and result-oriented to the team bringing the present action. But the losses also seemed to be at least in part the fault of the previous appellants, who had never raised any of the salient constitutional violations that marred FCHR’s dismissals without determination. Accordingly, the present Plaintiff did not stop at showing that her whistleblower charge met all previous known standards of acceptability for investigation and determination on the merits of the charge. She went on to show that the FCHR dismissal without determination violated the numerous constitutional rights set forth in the Complaint in the instant case. Under the constitutions of the United States and the State of Florida, every charging party under the whistleblower statute is entitled to a day in court.

However, the First District Court of Appeal declined to reach any of the constitutional issues in its opinion disposing the case. Indeed, that court declined even to mention the constitutional issues, let alone decide them. The opinion stuck strictly to interpretation of the whistleblower statute, as decided in that court’s old cases. This spurred Plaintiff to file a motion for rehearing, which, among other things, pointed out that the DCA’s silence on the constitutional issues deprived Plaintiff of her jurisdiction to have the Florida Supreme Court consider the constitutional issues. The Supreme Court could not take up those issues where the DCA did not decide them. The court denied rehearing without comment.

Thus, Plaintiff is here to litigate the constitutional issues for the first time. Accordingly, no res judicata or collateral estoppel is even theoretically possible. These forms of preclusion require that a point be actually decided by the prior court. It is not enough that one or more parties mentioned it.

II. BOTH RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL REQUIRE AN ACTUAL DECISION, NOT A BARE MENTION

In Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1952), the Florida Supreme Court held that the test in determining whether judgment by estoppel applies to a case is “whether the evidence in both cases is in essence the same” and whether ‘“every point and question’ presented in the second action was actually litigated and decided in the first.” 59 So.2d at 45. For res judicata or collateral estoppel to apply, there must also exist in the prior litigation a “clearcut former adjudication” on the merits. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. LaPlante, 470 So.2d 832, 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); see also R.D.J. Enters., Inc. v. Mega Bank, 600 So.2d 1229, 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that collateral estoppel prevents re-litigation of issues that have been fully litigated and which resulted in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction).

No issue in this case was previously litigated to conclusion. Thus there is no preclusion under Florida law. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.1995) (noting that Florida courts have emphasized that judgment by estoppel “precludes re-litigation of issues actually litigated in a prior proceeding”) (court’s emphasis). It is never enough that an issue was presented and not decided. That seems to escape Defendants, who (Motion at 4-5), claim it is enough that Plaintiff, in her Complaint, mentioned (a) that she raised constitutional issues and (b) that the First DCA made a ruling. That sweep of legerdemain omits the fact that the ruling made by the First DCA had nothing to do with the constitutional issues. This is a dispositive fact that makes irrelevant the Defendants’ reliance on Barrington v. Florida Dept, of Health,112 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2000). Barrington is a case in which an employee who litigated and lost her discrimination claim at the Public Employee Relations Commission (PERC) was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel from relitigating the same race discrimination in federal court. Though the statutory regimen was different and the employee was on the offense in federal court but on the defense at PERC, there was still a determination of the exact same issue - whether her termination was because of race discrimination. Moreover, the employee in Barrington had a full due process hearing, whereas in the instant case Plaintiff has had no opportunity to present documents or witnesses nor to cross examine anyone, nor even to be informed of the grounds for her termination. That, in itself, would be enough to prevail on this motion because it is well-settled that preclusion will not apply where it would result in a manifest injustice. See, e.g., Beverly Beach Properties, Inc. v. Nelson , 68 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1953); Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 1965); Flesche v. Interstate Warehouse, 411 So. 2d 919, 924 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982); see also State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 2003).

III. MOTION IS NOT COGNIZABLE

Res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). These defenses may not be used in a motion to dismiss. Garnac Grain Co., Inc. v. Mejia, 962 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). They must be pled first in an answer. Palmer v. McCallion, 645 So.2d 131, 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

Although the defense of res judicata can look jurisdictional in character, it is an affirmative defense, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1), and therefore is not a per se jurisdictional bar to court review as contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (and thus the Florida rule which is based on that federal rule.). Youngin's Auto Body v. District of Columbia, 775 F.Supp.2d 1,6 (D.D.C. 2011); and see, Hemphill v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 605 F.Supp.2d 183, 186 (D.D.C.2009) (observing that “res judicata is an affirmative defense that is generally pleaded in a defendant's answer, but is also properly brought in a pre-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion”).

Though it is true that there is an exception that permits res judicata and collateral estoppel to support a motion to dismiss where the facts that establish such defenses are stated on the face of the Complaint, this is not such a case. Indeed, the refutation of res judicata and collateral estoppel is set forth in the Complaint, which stated at Paragraph 26, “The appeals court failed to acknowledge or address any of the constitutional issues, even on rehearing, and found FCHR to have an “inherent” power to decline jurisdiction over a whistleblower charge.” Thus, according to the Complaint, the First DCA did not decide anything that is advanced in this case, so its decision can have no preclusive impact.

The Defendants have compounded the error by purporting to rest the motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, Rule 1.140(b)(1), instead of the more common “failure-to-state-a-cause-of-action” basis, Rule 1.40(b)(6). There are two apparent reasons for the latter error. First, there is a body of law, already referenced, barring res judicata and collateral estoppel from serving as bases for that sort of motion to dismiss. Second, a motion under Rule 1.40(b)(6) must stay within the confines of the four comers of the Complaint, while a motion under Rule 1.140(b)(1), to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, may bring in extraneous evidence. But the very idea of affirmative defenses defeating subject matter jurisdiction is fatally flawed both legally and logically. Subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); Page v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, 308 So.3d 953 (Fla. 2020). By contrast, “res judicata is an affirmative defense which must be pled, and may be waived, by the defendant.” Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

Thus the motion is not cognizable under the procedural vehicle on which it rides in because it in no way implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

The motion to dismiss should be denied. The motion is substantively incorrect in that it purports to find preclusion in a prior proceeding that did not address the constitutional issues that form the basis of the instant Complaint. The motion also suffers from fatal procedural infirmities in that it seeks to conscript res judicata and collateral estoppel into service as bases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when they are affirmative defenses that are subject to waiver and thus can never support a finding of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to all counsel of record through the Court’s portal, this 12th day of July, 2023.

	/s/ Richard E. Johnson
	Richard E. Johnson

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 308 | ORDER OF DISMISSAL

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
MICHELLE WILSON Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, Defendant.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case #: 2023 CA 001569

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Having reviewed the motion and Plaintiffs response in opposition, and having heard arguments of the parties on December 6, 2023, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for the reasons set forth below.

The Plaintiff Michelle Wilson, was dismissed from her employment in October 2020, and believed that her dismissal was retaliation for reporting wrongdoing by her employer in violation of the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act (WBA). Florida law provides that employees and former employees who believe they 'have been subjected to retaliation by an employer after making a disclosure protected by the WBA may file a complaint, or “whistle-blower charge,” with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). § 112.31895(1X3), Fla. Stat. Thereafter, the WBA accords investigative power to the FCHR determine whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that a prohibited action or a pattern of prohibited action has occurred, is occurring, or is to be taken.” § 112.31895(2 X1), Fla. Stat , Upon receipt of a determination, the employee or former employee may file a claim under the WBA in circuit court. Where the FCHR dismisses a. whistleblower charge without making a determination, that decision is appealable to the First District Court of Appeal. § 120,68, Fla. Stat,

Here, the FCHR concluded that Plaintiffs whistle-blower charge was inadequate and, after giving Plaintiff an opportunity to amend, dismissed it without making determination. Because FCHR dismissed Plaintiffs whistle-blower charge without making a determination, she was unable to exhaust the administrative prerequisite for bringing a civil claim under the WBA in circuit court. She appealed the dismissal to the First DCA.

On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the authority of FCHR to dismiss a whistle-blower charge without making a determination, argued that its failure to do so violated her state and federal constitutional rights, and raised issues of separation of powers, conflict of interest, due process, access to courts, and right to trial by jury. After briefing and oral argument, the First DCA affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff s whistle-blower charge, but in its order did not explicitly address the merits of Plaintiff s constitutional arguments.

Plaintiff then filed this action, asserting seven (7) state and federal constitutional claims “ to force consideration of her constitutional claims.” [Complaint, I27]. Plaintiffs claims are based on her contention that “ FCHR was required to issue a negative determination on every charge.” [Complaint, II 22]. Plaintiff argues that though her constitutional claims were raised and argued on appeal, the failure of the appeals court “to acknowledge or address any of the constitutional issues, even on rehearing” [Complaint, I26] means that this Court can now consider them without relitigating issues that have already been decided.

Defendants moved to dismiss this action based on collateral estoppel and argue that the First DCA’s affirmance of FCHR’s dismissal of Plaintiffs whistle-blower charge precludes Plaintiffs constitutional claims here.¹ The First DCA has repeatedly held that FCHR may dismiss a charge if it “does not meet the prima facie elements necessary to initiate the operation of the Act.” Stanton v, Florida Dept , of Health , 129 So. 3d 1083, 1084 ( Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (affirming FCHR’s dismissal of a Charge because it did not describe a disclosure that would trigger the protection of the WBA); Tillery v , Florida Dept of Juvenile Justice, 104 So. 3d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (affirming FCHR’s dismissal of a charge because it did not assert “when or to whom” a disclosure was made) Caldwell v. Florida Dept, of Elder Affairs, 121 So. 3d 1062, 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (affirming dismissal of charge by FCHR because allegations in the charge were conclusory and did not describe any act or suspected act of misfeasance or malfeasance”).

For each of her claims, Plaintiff would have this Court conclude that FCHR had no authority to dismiss her whistle-blower charge, contrary to the judgment of the First DCA.

Defendants are correct. When a court “decides an issue necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the same issue on a different cause of action between the same parties. ” Barrington v . Florida Dept of Health , 112 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303 ( M.D. Fla. 2000).

Because the First DCA previously found, in an action between these parties, that dismissal of Plaintiffs whistle-blower charge was appropriate. Plaintiffs claims are barred by collateral estoppel

Accordingly, Plaintiff s Complaint is dismissed, with prejudice.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of December, 2023.


	John C. Cooper Circuit Judge

Copies to:

Jamie Ito
Richard E. Johnson

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

¹ While collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that typically should not be raised by motion to dismiss, Plaintiff specifically referenced the appeal of FCHR’s dismissal of her whistle-blower charge to the First DCA in her Complaint, noting the constitutional issues she raised and the First DCA’s ruling. Thus, this Court may consider the First DCA’s ruling in deciding this motion. Duncan v Prudential Ins. Co., 690 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)

ITEM 309 | JUDGMENT

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
MICHELLE WILSON Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, Defendant.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case #: 2023 CA 001569

FINAL JUDGMENT

THIS COURT granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on December 29, 2023. All judicial labor has been completed on this case.

It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

That Final Judgment is entered for Defendant Florida Commission on Human Relations, that Plaintiff shall take nothing by her action and that Defendant shall go hence without day.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Tallahassee, Leon County , Florida this 23rd day of January, 2024.


	John C. Cooper Circuit Judge

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

ITEM 310 | NOTICE OF APPEAL

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
MICHELLE WILSON Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, Defendant.	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	Case #: 2023 CA 001569

NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE IS GIVEN that, Plaintiff/Appellant, Michelle Wilson, appeals to the First District Court of Appeal the order of this court rendered on January 23, 2024, and attached hereto. The nature of the order is a final order entering judgment for Defendants.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Jamie Ito Jamie@ItoLaw.net, this 22d day of February, 2024, through the court's electronic filing system.

	/s/ Richard E. Johnson
	Richard E. Johnson

Plaintiff	Defendants
Michelle Wilson, FCHR Director (2011 - 2020)	• Florida Commission on Human Relations, The • Florida Department of Financial Services, The • Cheyanne Costilla, FCHR Director (2020 - now)

Congratulations! You're now booked up on this chapter's court filings which reveal the FCHR's corruptions (by (i) pressuring staff for predetermined outcomes; (ii) adjudicating itself; (iii) obtructing cases; and much more)!

Keep this in mind while you litigate your civil rights case in Florida. Also, keep in mind the FCHR's statutory ability to accept bribes.

Plus - at all times - keep the 7th Amendment of the US Constitution (your right to a trial-by-jury) in mind.

As always, please get the justice you deserve.

Sincerely,

www.TextBookDiscrimination.com

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	How-To: Reply Brief
	How-To: Dismiss (Response)
	Info: FCHR Bribery
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FCHR CORRUPTIONMichelle Wilson v. The Florida Commission on Human RelationsChapter 3: Trial Court

All Pertinent Documents

ITEM 301 | COVER SHEET

FORM 1.997. CIVIL COVER SHEET

I. CASE STYLE

II. AMOUNT OF CLAIM

III. TYPE OF CASE

CIRCUIT CIVIL

COUNTY CIVIL

COMPLEX BUSINESS COURT

IV. REMEDIES SOUGHT (check all that apply):

V. NUMBER OF CAUSES OF ACTION: [ ]

VI. IS THIS CASE A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT?

VII. HAS NOTICE OF ANY KNOWN RELATED CASE BEENFILED?

VIII. IS JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN COMPLAINT?

IX. DOES THIS CASE INVOLVE ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE?

ITEM 302 | CIVIL COMPLAINT

COMPLAINT

JURISDICTION, VENUE, PARTIES

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

COUNT IU.S. CONSTITUTIONFIRST AMENDMENT - RIGHT TO PETITION42 U.S.C. § 1983(Against Costilla, official and individual capacities)

COUNT IIU.S. CONSTITUTIONFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - DUE PROCESS - NEUTRAL TRIBUNAL42 U.S.C. § 1983(Against Costilla, official and individual capacities)

COUNT IIIU.S. CONSTITUTIONFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - DUE PROCESS42 U.S.C. § 1983(Against Costilla, official and individual capacities)

COUNT IVFLORIDA CONSTITUTIONArticle I, § 9 - DUE PROCESS(Against FCHR)

COUNT VFLORIDA CONSTITUTIONArticle I, § 21 - Right of Access to Court(Against FCHR)

COUNT VIFLORIDA CONSTITUTIONArticle I, § 22 - Trial by Jury(Against FCHR)

COUNT VIIFLORIDA CONSTITUTIONArticle II, § 3 - SEPARATION OF POWERS(Against FCHR)

PRAYER OF RELIEF

JURY DEMAND

ITEM 303 | SUMMONS (CHEYANNE COSTILLA, FCHR AGENCY HEAD)

SUMMONS

ITEM 304 | SUMMONS (DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES)

SUMMONS

ITEM 305 | SUMMONS (FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS)

SUMMONS

ITEM 306 | DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

I. FACTS ALLEGED

II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

III. WBA FRAMEWORK

IV. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

V. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ITEM 307 | PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

I. PRIOR PROCEEDING

II. BOTH RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL REQUIRE AN ACTUAL DECISION, NOT A BARE MENTION

III. MOTION IS NOT COGNIZABLE

CONCLUSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ITEM 308 | ORDER OF DISMISSAL

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

ITEM 309 | JUDGMENT

FINAL JUDGMENT

ITEM 310 | NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE OF APPEAL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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