Standards of Review
– The Established Citations –

Claims of absolute immunity present questions of law that we review de novo . Rich v. Dollar , 841 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1988).

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision whether to draw an adverse inference based on destruction of evidence. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 745 (8th Cir.2003). An adverse inference is appropriate only when, among other things, the party seeking the inference can show that once-extant records were destroyed “to suppress the truth,” and that the records would have favored its case.

A district court's "decision to alter or amend judgment is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 507 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess Assocs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 1985)). A district court's denial of a motion for leave to amend is reviewed under the same abuse of discretion standard. See Laurie v. Ala. Court of Criminal Appeals, 256 F.3d 1266, 1269(11th Cir. 2001).

We review denials of Rule 59(e) motions for an abuse of discretion. Thomas v. Farmville Mfg. Co., 705 F.2d 1307, 1307 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam). The district court's denial of the Rule 59(e) motion based on a miscomprehension of the law was an abuse of discretion. United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir.2008). However, we affirm the denial on the merits. See Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 613 (11th Cir.1995) (“[W]e may affirm the district court's decision on any adequate ground, even if it is other than the one on which the court actually relied.”).

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a motion to amend. Henson v. Columbus Bank Trust Co., 770 F.2d 1566, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985). A district court's discretion to dismiss a complaint without leave to amend "is `severely restrict[ed]' by Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), which directs that leave to amend `shall be freely given when justice so requires.'" Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).

We review a district court’s discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir.2003). We also review a district court’s decision not to appoint counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.2004).

"Whether the facts as found suffice to render the plaintiff a `prevailing party' is a legal question reviewed de novo." Church of Scientology, 2 F.3d at 1513. Finally, a district court's determination that a party has prevailed for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.

We also review de novo a district court's determination of res judicata or collateral estoppel. See Jang v. United Techs. Corp, 206 F.3d 1147, 1149 (11th Cir. 2000).

We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration. MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 946 (11th Cir.1999)

We review de novo a district court's determination that a plaintiff lacks Article III standing to pursue a § 1985(2) claim. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Fla. State Athletic Comm'n, 226 F.3d 1226, 1228 (11th Cir. 2000). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate

"(1) an injury in fact;

(2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and

(3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."

We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and review its conclusions of law de novo. See American Dredging Co. v. Lambert, 153 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998).

In Bajakajian, we expressly noted that the courts of appeals must review the proportionality determination "de novo" and specifically rejected the suggestion of the respondent, who had prevailed in the District Court, that the trial judge's determination of excessiveness should be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. "The factual findings made by the district courts in conducting the excessiveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.... But the question whether a fine is constitutionally excessive calls for the application of a constitutional standard to the facts of a particular case, and in this context de novo review of that question is appropriate." 524 U. S., at 336-337, n. 10 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 697 (1996)).

We review a district court's interpretation and application of a statute de novo. International Union v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 6 F.3d 722, 724 (11th Cir. 1993).

An interpretation of statutory language that causes other language within the statute to be meaningless contravenes the "`elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.'" Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249, 105 S.Ct. 2587, 2594 (1985) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392, 99 S.Ct. 675, 684 (1979))

This court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for civil contempt under the abuse of discretion standard. See Jordan v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Upon appellate review, a civil contempt order may be upheld only if the proof of the defendant's contempt is clear and convincing.

We "give great deference to a district court's interpretation of its local rules" and review a district court's application of local rules for an abuse of discretion. Quick v. Peoples Bank of Cullman County, 993 F.2d 793, 798 (11th Cir. 1993); Clark v. Housing Auth. of Alma, 971 F.2d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1992).

We review the district court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment action for abuse of discretion. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289-90, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995).

In sum, we conclude that Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942), governs this declaratory judgment action and that district courts' decisions about the propriety of hearing declaratory judgment actions, which are necessarily bound up with their decisions about the propriety of granting declaratory relief, should be reviewed for abuse of discretion.

We review a district court’s discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir.2003). We also review a district court’s decision not to appoint counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.2004).

We review de novo the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

The language of section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards in reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Of course, we review dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, viewing the allegations in the complaint as true. E.g., South Fla. Water Management Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 406 (11th Cir. 1996).

Whether the doctrine of equitable tolling saves a cause of action otherwise barred by the statute of limitations is a question of law which we consider de novo. Miranda v. B B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1531 (11th Cir. 1992).

We review a denial of a request for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978), for abuse of discretion. United States v. Barsoum, 763 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2014).

Title VII specifically requires a federal employee to exhaust his administrative remedies as a precondition to filing suit. Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1961, 1965, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) ("Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him."); see also Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1980) (Title VII "contemplates the invocation of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to litigation" by a federal employee) (citing Brown). Whether a claimant has satisfied that precondition is itself a question of law reviewable de novo.

We review the district court's decision to dismiss a case for failure to comply with the rules of the court for an abuse of discretion. Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.2005). "Discretion means the district court has a `range of choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.'"

Because the focal issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs’ suit for want of prosecution, we recount in detail the events leading up to the court’s order.

The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S. Ct. 252, 266, 70 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1981). "Factual determinations are reviewed for clear error." Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir.2001).

A determination of frivolity is best left to the district court, and we will review such determinations only for abuse of discretion. See McWilliams v. State of Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying abuse of discretion standard to review § 1915(e) frivolity dismissal); Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). But see McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying de novo standard to review § 1915(e)(2) claims based on changes to statute by PLRA).

A grant of an injunction may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion by the district court. United States v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450, 1458 (11th Cir. 1986).

The defendants argue, on the other hand, that we should review the decision of the district court only for abuse of discretion.

We agree with the defendants. The principle of international comity applied in this case is an abstention doctrine. Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004).

We review the district court’s decision disallowing the deposition testimony for abuse of discretion, Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 773 (10th Cir.1999), and the district court’s interpretation of the federal rules de novo. United States v. Medina-Estrada, 81 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir.1996).

We review the district court's denial of a motion only for joinder for abuse of discretion. See Alexander v. Fulton County, Georgia, 207 F.3d 1303, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000). The district court has broad discretion to join parties or not and that decision will not be overturned as long as it falls within the district court's range of choices.

Moreover, these alleged material factual disputes advanced by the Ellises are irrelevant to the legal determination of whether absolute immunity is applicable. See Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir.1988) ("[C]laims of absolute... immunity turn on questions of law;" therefore, our review is de novo.). We conclude that this court appropriately has jurisdiction to decide the legislative immunity issue presented to us.

Whether we have jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Bright Metal Specialties, Inc., 251 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001).

Likewise, we review de novo federal-versus-state, or Erie, choice-of-law questions, Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002), and state-versus-state choice-of-law questions, AIG Baker Sterling Heights, L.L.C. v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 508 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 2007).

Likewise, we review de novo federal-versus-state, or Erie, choice-of-law questions, Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002), and state-versus-state choice-of-law questions, AIG Baker Sterling Heights, L.L.C. v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 508 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 2007).

We review de novo whether jury instructions accurately summarize the law, “but give the district court substantial discretion to formulate the instructions... [provided that the instructions] represent[ ] a complete and correct statement of the law.” United States v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490, 499 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir.2007)). Our review can be thought of as involving two steps. First, we review the legal accuracy of a jury instruction de novo. United States v. McKnight, 665 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir.2011), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, 671 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.2012) and cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2756, 183 L.Ed.2d 626 (2012), reh'g denied,––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 87, 183 L.Ed.2d 727 (2012). Second, if we determine that that the instruction is legally accurate at the first step, we then examine the district court's particular phrasing of the instruction for abuse of discretion. Id. at 790–91. We will reverse at this second step “only if it appears both that the jury was misled and that the instructions prejudiced the defendant.” Id. at 791 (quoting United States v. Curry, 538 F.3d 718, 731 (7th Cir.2008)).

But we review the district court’s legal conclusions in a § 2255 proceeding de novo and the underlying facts for clear error. Castillo v. United States, 200 F.3d 735, 736 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 531 U.S. 845, 121 S.Ct. 114, 148 L.Ed.2d 70 (2000).

This court has historically in unpublished opinions reviewed a denial of coram nobis relief for abuse of discretion, see Warton v. United States, 971 F.2d 756 (11th Cir. 1992), and following the practice in other circuits we deem that to be the proper standard of review — keeping in mind that an error of law is an abuse of discretion per se. See Fleming v. United States, 146 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Camacho-Bordes, 94 F.3d 1168, 1173 (8th Cir. 1996).

Because Schultz did not raise his challenge to the magistrate judge's authority in the district court, however, we review it only for plain error. United States v. Freixas, 332 F.3d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Freixas's argument concerning the magistrate judge's authority is advanced for the first time on appeal, and accordingly we review it only for plain error."

“Abuse-of-discretion review of the likelihood of a miscarriage of justice is analogous to the abuse-of-discretion review of Rule 11 sanctions... In the present circumstances, where the subject of our review for an abuse of discretion is an appellate court's conclusion that a threatened miscarriage of justice is sufficient to justify recalling the mandate, I believe that we similarly must give some deference to the Court of Appeals's preliminary analysis that there may have been a misapplication of a legal standard, even though we would not defer to it if we were addressing the ultimate question on the merits, whether a trial court had committed legal error.”

Whether a case is moot is a question of law that we review de novo. Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach County, 382 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir.2004).

We review the district court's grant of a new trial for abuse of discretion. See Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689 F.2d 964, 973 (11th Cir. 1982).

We review a district court's award of damages under a clearly erroneous standard. Taylor Rental Corp. v. J.I. Case Co., 749 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985).

We review de novo a district court's summary judgment denial of official immunity. See Cummings v. DeKalb Cnty., 24 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir.1994); Griesel v. Hamlin, 963 F.2d 338, 341 (11th Cir.1992).

We review the denial of a petition to proceed in forma pauperis for abuse of discretion, Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 (11th Cir.2004), but we review interpretations of the Act de novo, Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir.2004). We review the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Forsyth Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir.2011).

After ruling that AHA could recover 41% of its proven damages, the district court denied AHA's request for prejudgment interest on its damages award. AHA argues that the court erred in this regard. We review the district court's decision on whether to award prejudgment interest for abuse of discretion. Insurance Co. of North America v. M/V Ocean Lynx, 901 F.2d 934, 942 (11th Cir. 1990).

We review the factual findings underlying a district court's determination regarding prevailing party status for clear error. Church of Scientology Flag Serv., Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1509, 1512-13 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 54, 130 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994).

We review de novo whether the officers are entitled to immunity. Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972, 981 (11th Cir.2012) (official immunity); Townsend v. Jefferson Cty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir.2010) (qualified immunity); Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297, 1313 (11th Cir.2011) (sovereign immunity).

With respect to Sentencing Guidelines issues, this Court reviews "purely legal questions de novo, a district court's factual findings for clear error, and, in most cases, a district court's application of the guidelines to the facts with `due deference.'" United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir.2003)). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). And the "due deference" standard is, itself, tantamount to clear error review. See United States v. White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2003). For a finding to be clearly erroneous, this Court "must be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d at 1137 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Consequently, we are not required to defer to the administrative law judge. Because the case involves a pure issue of law, we review the order by the de novo standard of review.

(Ohio law applied to determine common law marriage).⁵ Since the domestic relations issue here arose in the determination of the right to receive benefits under FEGLI, a federal statute, the district court erred to the extent its decision not to grant the motion to reconsider relied upon its inclination not to review domestic relations issues when state law provides the rule of decision. However, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that the evidence would not be considered because it was not newly discovered and its credibility was doubtful.

⁵ Although the appropriate standard of review is generally whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, when the lower court rejects an application under Rule 59(e) based upon an erroneous legal doctrine, our standard of review is the same as in other cases of legal error.

Mr. Perkins argues that the district court was obligated to recuse sua sponte and that the district court erred when it denied Mr. Perkins’s pro se motion to recuse before his sentencing hearing. We review these arguments under the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir.2004).

While it may be true that sound administration of the Declaratory Judgment Act calls for the exercise of "judicial discretion, hardened by experience into rule," Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, at 293, proper application of the abuse of discretion standard on appellate review can, we think, provide appropriate guidance to district courts.

This, accompanied by the reasons explained below, leads to our conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion by the district court denying Cano Rule 60(b) relief.

We review a district court's denial of a Rule 60(b)(3) motion for abuse of discretion. Cox Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc. v. CTI, Inc., 478 F.3d 1303, 1314 (11th Cir.2007).

We review the district court's order for abuse of discretion, and we are bound by the district court's findings unless clearly erroneous. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2761, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977); Lee v. Anniston City School Sys., 737 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1984).

A district court's conclusions as to res judicata are conclusions of law, and are thus reviewable de novo by this Court. See McDonald v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 821 F.2d 1563, 1565 (11th Cir. 1987).

"We review de novo the legality of an order of restitution, but we review factual findings underlying a restitution order for clear error." United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir.2006). Whether a person is a "victim" is a legal conclusion we review de novo, "but proximate cause is a factual finding we review for clear error." United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1334 (11th Cir.2007).

We review de novo the district court's rulings on motions under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, examining the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Thosteson v. United States, 331 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003).

A court's decision to deny sanctions under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's inherent power is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005); Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1998). A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or bases the decision "upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous." Cordoba, 419 F.3d at 1180 (citation omitted).

With respect to Sentencing Guidelines issues, this Court reviews "purely legal questions de novo, a district court's factual findings for clear error, and, in most cases, a district court's application of the guidelines to the facts with `due deference.'" United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir.2003)).

We will not disturb a district court's decision not to order separate trials absent an abuse of discretion. See Itel Corp. v. Cups Coal Co., 707 F.2d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 1983).

We will reverse the lower court's denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment only for abuse of discretion, see Fla. Physician's Ins. Co. v. Ehlers, 8 F.3d 780, 783 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Gibbs v. Air Canada, 810 F.2d 1529, 1537 (11th Cir. 1987) and Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1020 (11th Cir. 1982)), and we have cautioned that "appellant cannot prevail simply because the [bankruptcy court] properly could have vacated its order." Solaroll Shade Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1977)). Instead, to show an abuse of discretion, the "appellant must demonstrate a justification so compelling that the [lower] court was required to vacate its order."

We review an approval of a settlement agreement under the abuse of discretion standard. See Leverso v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., 18 F.3d 1527, 1531 (11th Cir. 1994).

We review a dismissal on Rule 8 shotgun pleading grounds for an abuse of discretion. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office , 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Shotgun pleadings violate Rule 8, which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), by "fail[ing] to one degree or another... to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests."

District court denials of state sovereign immunity under Alabama law are immediately appealable to this Court. Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996). We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. Id. at 383. If the complaint contains a claim that is facially subject to an affirmative defense, that claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003); Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

We review issues of standing de novo. DiMaio v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

It is settled that if a party submits materially false evidence in a civil proceeding, whether in discovery or at trial, the court has the discretion to strike the offending party's claim or defense as a sanction. See Long v. Swofford, 805 So.2d 882 (Fla.3d DCA 2001)

Appellant, Betty K Agencies, LTD. ("Betty K"), challenges the district court's sua sponte order dismissing with prejudice its maritime claims against Appellees Tidal Wave Limited ("Tidal Wave") and M/V MONADA ("MONADA"). Because the district court dismissed the case with prejudice as a sanction for failure to answer a counterclaim and perfect service of process, without finding that Betty K acted with willful or contumacious disregard for court rules, and without finding that lesser sanctions were somehow inadequate, we vacate the district court's Dismissal Order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Here, the district court ignored the unambiguous standard that has governed dismissals with prejudice. The Dismissal Order merely recites the rules Betty K purportedly violated, and makes no finding that Betty K's seemingly inadvertent and isolated mistake was willful or contumacious. Moreover, the district court failed to find, explicitly or implicitly, that lesser sanctions were inadequate to correct Betty K's untimely filing. The district court's failure to make either finding was a clear abuse of discretion.

The subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is a question of law and, therefore, subject to de novo review. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 1253 (11th Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3284, 111 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990).

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo , considering the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc. , 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009).

We exercise plenary review over the district court's grant of summary judgment. Chapman v. Klemick, 3 F.3d 1508, 1509 (11th Cir. 1993).

Woodard neither objected to the plea proceedings conducted by the magistrate judge nor subsequently moved to withdraw his plea at his sentencing hearing; therefore, we review the statutory and constitutional issues raised in his appeal for plain error. See United States v. Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Because [the defendant] made no objection to the magistrate judge's conducting of voir dire, we review the district court's delegation of jury selection to the magistrate judge only for plain error."); see also United States v. Acevedo, 285 F.3d 1010, 1011-12 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting constitutional issues not raised in the district court are subject to plain error review). The four-prong test to establish plain error is:

(1) there must have been an error;

(2) the error must have been plain;

(3) the error must have seriously affected substantial rights; and

(4) the error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Acevedo, 285 F.3d at 1012.

Mr. Tietig argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying a fifth extension and by refusing to consider the untimely responses' to defendants’ motions for summary judgment. We cannot agree.

When we review a district court’s decision under the abuse of discretion. standard

Mr. Hollis argues that the district court erred in dismissing the action due to improper venue under state law. Our review of the district court's decision is plenary. See, e.g., Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1390 (11th Cir. 1997).