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4 PJI 21 | RETALIATION – 42 USC §1981

In this case, [Plaintiff] claims that [Defendant] retaliated against [Plaintiff] because [he/she] took steps to enforce [his/her] lawful rights under the Federal Civil Rights statutes that prohibit employers from discriminating against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of the employee’s race.

Laws that prohibit discrimination in the workplace also prohibit an employer from taking any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee has asserted rights or made complaints under those laws.

An employee may make a discrimination complaint as a means to enforce what [he/she] believed in good faith to be [his/her] lawful rights. So, even if a complaint of discrimination against an employer is later found to be invalid or without merit, the employee cannot be penalized in retaliation for having made such a complaint if you find that the employee made the complaint as a means of seeking to enforce what the employee believed in good faith to be [his/her] lawful rights. To establish “good faith,” however, it is insufficient for [Plaintiff] merely to allege that [his/her] belief in this regard was honest and bona fide; the allegations and the record must also establish that the belief, though perhaps mistaken, was objectively reasonable.

[Plaintiff] claims that [Defendant] [describe adverse employment action] because [Plaintiff] [describe protected activity].

[Defendant] denies [Plaintiff]’s claim and asserts that [describe the defendant’s defense].

To succeed on [his/her] claim, [Plaintiff] must prove each of the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence:
First: [Plaintiff] engaged in a protected activity;

Second: [Defendant] then took an adverse employment action;

Third: [Plaintiff]’s protected activity was a motivating factor that prompted [Defendant] to take the adverse employment action; and

Fourth: [Plaintiff] suffered damages because of the adverse employment action.
[In the verdict form that I will explain in a moment, you will be asked to answer questions about these factual issues.]

For the first element, [Plaintiff] claims that [he/she] engaged in protected activity when [he/she] [describe opposition clause activity]. That action is “protected activity” if it was based on [Plaintiff]’s good-faith, reasonable belief that [Defendant] discriminated against [him/her/another employee] because of [protected trait]. [Plaintiff] had a “good faith” belief if [he/she] honestly believed that [Defendant] discriminated against [him/her/another employee] because of [protected trait]. [Plaintiff] had a “reasonable” belief if a reasonable person would, under the circumstances, believe that [Defendant] discriminated against [him/her/another employee] because of [protected trait]. [Plaintiff] does not have to prove that [Defendant] actually discriminated against [him/her/another employee] because of [protected trait]. But [he/she] must prove that [he/she] had a good-faith, reasonable belief that [Defendant] did so.

For the second element, [Plaintiff] claims that [Defendant] took an adverse employment action against [him/her] when [Defendant] [describe adverse employment action]. You must decide whether [describe adverse employment action] is an adverse employment action.

An “adverse employment action” is any type of action that would have made a reasonable employee reluctant to make or support a charge of discrimination. Put another way, if a reasonable employee would be less likely to complain about or oppose alleged discrimination because [he/she] knew that [Defendant] would [describe adverse employment action], then that action is an adverse employment action. If the employment action would not make it less likely for a reasonable employee to make complaints about or oppose the alleged discrimination, it is not an adverse employment action.

For the third element, if you find that [Plaintiff] engaged in protected activity and that [Defendant] took an adverse employment action against [him/her], you must decide whether [Plaintiff]’s protected activity was a “motivating factor” in the decision.

To prove that protected activity was a motivating factor in [Defendant]’s decision, [Plaintiff] does not have to prove that [his/her] protected activity was the only reason that [Defendant] [describe adverse employment action]. It is enough if [Plaintiff] proves that [his/her] protected activity influenced the decision. If [Plaintiff]’s protected activity made a difference in [Defendant]’s decision, you may find that it was a motivating factor in the decision.

[Defendant] claims that [Plaintiff]’s protected activity was not a motivating factor in the decision and that [he/she] [describe adverse employment action] for [another reason/other reasons]. An employer may not take an adverse action against an employee because of the employee’s protected activity, but an employer may [describe adverse employment action] an employee for any other reason, good or bad, fair or unfair. If you believe [Defendant]’s reason[s] for [his/her/its] decision and you find that [Defendant]’s decision was not motivated by [Plaintiff]’s protected activity, you must not second guess that decision, and you must not substitute your own judgment for [Defendant]’s judgment – even if you do not agree with it.

[Pretext (optional, see annotations): As I have explained, [Plaintiff] has the burden to prove that [his/her] protected activity was a motivating factor in [Defendant]’s decision to [describe adverse employment action]. I have explained to you that evidence can be direct or circumstantial. To decide whether [Plaintiff]’s protected activity was a motivating factor in [Defendant]’s decision to [describe adverse employment action], you may consider the circumstances of [Defendant]’s decision. For example, you may consider whether you believe the reason[s] that [Defendant] gave for the decision. If you do not believe the reason[s] that [he/she/it] gave for the decision, you may consider whether the reason[s] [was/were] so unbelievable that [it was/they were] a cover-up to hide the true retaliatory reasons for the decision.]

[Including Affirmative Defense (if applicable, see annotations): If you find in [Plaintiff]’s favor the first three elements [he/she] must prove, you must decide whether [Defendant] has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that [he/she/it] would have [describe adverse employment action] [Plaintiff] even if [Defendant] had not taken [Plaintiff]’s protected activity into account. If you find that [Plaintiff] would have been [describe adverse employment action] for reasons other than [his/her] protected activity, you must make that finding in your verdict

If you find for [Plaintiff] and against [Defendant] on this defense, you must decide whether [Defendant]’s acts were the proximate cause of damages that [Plaintiff] sustained. Put another way, you must decide, if [Defendant] had not [describe adverse employment action] [Plaintiff], whether these damages would have occurred.]

[Without Affirmative Defense: For the fourth element, you must decide whether [Defendant]’s acts were the proximate cause of damages that [Plaintiff] sustained. Put another way, you must decide, if [Defendant] had not [describe adverse employment action] [Plaintiff], whether these damages would have occurred.]

If you find that [Defendant]’s acts were the proximate cause of damages that [Plaintiff] sustained, you must determine the amount of damages.

[Insert damages instruction for §1981 from Pattern Instruction 4, supra.]

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

I. Causes of Action

Pattern Instruction 4.21 is intended to be used for retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. §1981 (“§1981”), though the Committee recommends that district courts review the causation annotation prior to instructing a jury on §1981 retaliation.

Pattern Instruction 4.21 is not intended to be used for retaliation claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §623(d); the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §12203(a); and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §215(a)(3). For retaliation claims under those statutes, please see Pattern Instruction 4.22, infra. Pattern Instruction 4.21 is also not intended to be used for retaliation claims arising under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. §4301 et seq. (“USERRA”) or the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §2601 et seq. For USERRA retaliation claims, please see Pattern Instruction 4.19, supra. For FMLA retaliation claims, please see Pattern Instruction 4.15, supra. Finally, Pattern Instruction 4.21 is not intended to be used for Title VII retaliatory hostile work environment claims. For retaliatory hostile work environment claims, please see annotation I(B) to Pattern Instructions 4.6 and 4.7.

II. Elements and Defenses

A. Protected Activity

Section 1981 does not contain an explicit anti-retaliation provision, but the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted §1981 to provide for a retaliation claim based on an employee’s complaints of race discrimination. See, e.g., Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 140 F.3d 1405, 1412-13 (11th Cir. 1998) accord CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (recognizing §1981 retaliation claim). The Eleventh Circuit analyzes claims brought under §1981 “using the burden-shifting scheme established for Title VII claims, since both statutes have the same proof requirements.” Jackson v. Geo Grp., Inc., 312 F. App’x 229, 233 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). In applying Title VII’s framework to §1981 retaliation claims, the Eleventh Circuit has analyzed §1981 claims under Title VII’s opposition clause. Id. at 233-34 & n.8 (applying Title VII’s antiretaliation provision to §1981 retaliation claim and noting that the plaintiff only had an “opposition clause” claim). Pattern Instruction 4.21 includes an opposition clause claim.

B. Adverse Employment Action

Pattern Instruction 4.21 includes a charge on the definition of an adverse employment action, which is based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern &Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), which requires proof that the challenged retaliatory conduct is “materially adverse.” Id. at 68.

C. Third Party Reprisals

In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011), the Supreme Court held that third-party reprisals are actionable under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII. Id. at 868. The plaintiff in Thompson stated a claim for retaliation by alleging that he was intentionally terminated because his fiancée filed an EEOC charge of discrimination against their mutual employer. Id. at 870. In cases involving third party reprisals, the charge will need to be adapted.

D. Causation

In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, based on the statutory language of the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove that “age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision,” not merely a motivating factor in the decision. Id. at 176-77. The Court also rejected the mixed motive defense (also known as the same decision defense) in the context of the ADEA, noting that unlike under Title VII, a mixed motive defense was not incorporated into the ADEA. Id. at 173-75. In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, No. 12-484, 2013 WL 3155234 (U.S. June 24, 2013), the Supreme Court extended the rationale of Gross to Title VII retaliation claims “[g]iven the lack of any meaningful textual difference between the text in” Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision and the ADEA’s anti-retaliation provision. Nassar, 2013 WL 3155234, at *10. Therefore, “Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in [42 U.S.C.] §2000e-2(m).” Id. at *14.

In First Amendment retaliation cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, a “motivating factor” causation standard applies based on Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), in which the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must show that protected First Amendment “conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ or to put it in other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor’” in the defendant’s challenged action. Id. at 287; see also Vila v. Padron, 484 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007) (requiring that protected speech play “a substantial or motivating role in the adverse employment action”).

The Eleventh Circuit did not, prior to this publication, decide whether the rationale of Gross and Nassar extends to §1981 claims, including §1981 retaliation claims. See Annotation II(A) to Pattern Instruction 4.9, supra. The Committee recommends that district courts review this issue prior to instructing a jury on §1981 retaliation.

E. Pretext

Pattern Instruction 4.21 includes in brackets an optional charge discussing the inference of pretext. The basis for this charge is explained in further detail in the annotations following Pattern Instruction 4.5, supra.

III. Remedies

The remedies for Title VII retaliation claims match the remedies for Title VII disparate treatment claim. See 42 U.S.C. §§1981a, 2000e-5(e)(3)(B), (g)(1). Thus, the jury charges on damages in the corresponding disparate treatment instructions may be incorporated into the model retaliation instruction as appropriate.

IV. When the Case Involves Both Discrimination and Retaliation Claims

In some cases, a plaintiff will bring both discrimination and retaliation claims. In those cases, the court should charge separately all of the elements of a discrimination and retaliation claim except damages, then give a charge on damages that applies to both types of claims.
Congratulations! You're now booked up on Pattern Jury Instruction 4 PJI 21 (US District Courts - 11th Circuit)!
You might need to reference it during your pursuit of justice.

For instance, you might need to examine this item in order to protect yourself from organizations/judges/lawyers who break the law (see this example of a Florida judge who outright committed perjury).

Nevertheless – and as always – please get the justice you deserve.

Sincerely,



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